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Tha purpose of this study was to trees the steps which 
led to the consolidation of'the Union Pacific end Kansas Pa­
cific Railroads in 1880. This merger wee a natural one*
uniting two Pacific roads created by the Union Pacific Enab- 
ling Act of 1862, but the methods used in bringing It'about 
were not "natural,'' in -order to understand hew this was1 
accomplished some consideration had to be given to the busi­
ness ethics of that period and the circumstances which moti­
vated Jay Gould, 'the prime mover behind the consolidation.
Material used in the preparation of this study was 
secured from two main sources, the Report of the ...United 
MlSaa gas&IM MUttft* and the Grenville Mellon
Dodge Papers* The nine-voluae Report was found in the Business
and Industrial Department of the Omaha Public Library, The 
Dodge Papers ware found in two locations* The entire collec­
tion (468 Boxed volumes) axe under the caxe of 'the lews State 
Historical and Art Museum* -Sea- Moines, lows. Extracts' and 
typed copies of many pertinent papers from- the- Dodge- collection 
are to be found In the Council Bluffs,- Iowa, Public Library*
When a person starts * research project he features a 
block of time in which he must shut himself off from outside 
civilisation, enter dark and lonely catacombs, and in all 
probability say good-bye to' people* The-research-for this
Vthesis has taken the author a good deal of time, but the
* i
time end- effort has brought quite a few'new acquaintances—  
ail of whom helped make what might have.been- a dreary job 
much more enjoyable. My deepest appreciation to these people, 
whose helpfulness and cooperation made this project a reality* 
To these friends and near-friends 1 respectfully dedicate this 
work*
T A I& t- J? ';aPklSE r jT '^ f tD 1st ©J? WlriS;©
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CHAPTER S
TH8 FIRST TRAKSeONTINtKTAL * THE UNION PACIFIC
The id** etl « transcontinental railroad fascinated the 
minds of Americans From th* time of the introduction of the 
steam locomotive into the United States. ' There was talk of 
connecting the Soot end loot Coasts as early ae the 1830’s but 
the development of railroading had -net reached a point where 
-this was practical. Nor wee such an idea feasible from a poll* 
tical standpoint, the Treaty of Guadelupe-Hidaigo signed in 
1§4S*. finally connected the western edge of the Louisiana Pur­
chase to the California coast end gave the United States owner­
ship of the m m  between. The land for the transcontinental was 
in hand} needed was a concrete plan for effecting a railroad 
across it*
One such plan had been put forth by Asa Whitney, New York
£
merchant end world traveler, in 1845. Whitney had the notion 
that a railroad should be built through the South Pass (in Wyo­
ming) to the Pacific Ocean with what he called "private capital**
Robert S. fo§el* The Union 
tef lOlfimiM. vBaltimorei 
.960), p . IB {Hubert ft .Russel, J
freed
Whitney would have bad the federal government, in order to 
maintain "'the principle of private enterprise and privet# r e ­
sponsibility,” sell to him eighty million acres of government
2
lend for a price of eight million dollars or ten cents an acre.
The Whitney method of financing the road would have"
been based upon the enhancement of -the vein#' of .the lend as e
result of idie railroad end selling it t» private individuals.
Whitney should have libelled it a ".wired enterprise* as later
; 3
interpreters* with hind-sight, so aptly did* It ls.#l*e ap*
parent today that the Whitney plan would .not have worked as h* 
envisioned ft because the price of land would net have .increased 
until after the railroad was completed* while the actual need 
for money was during the construction. Public reaction to the 
plan did not operate in Its favor} it was considered too pri­
vate, a swindle benefitting one man# although this did not' 
deter Whitney. A contemporary description held it to be a 
"wholesale stock-jobbing scheme foisted upon the public domain."
Another plan, tbit can be described as "quaai-govexnaian- 
tal* in scope flowed from the pen of William M. Gwin, 'Senator 
from California, in 18S3. the Gwin plan was fundamentally a
WipreMcmiLtCttt-OTr,
. <c*»
Fogsl, pa. clt.. p. 28*
IfeM** P. 29.
Quoted in ibid.. p. 29.
land grant philosophy, of the type inaugurated by Stephan A. 
Douglas for the Illinois Central Railroad in 1850, Gwtn origi­
nally proposed * grant of forty sections of loud for each mile 
of track laid. Four-fifths of the land Die to be given to the 
railroad after completion of each 100 mile section of track—  
the other one-fifth open completion of the entire road. The 
President of the United States would select the route and con­
struction would be supervised'by « commission reporting to the 
Secretary of »ar. the company was to reap the benefits fee 
thirty years whereupon ownership of the raid would revert to 
the government of the United States. During the .period of pri­
vate operation the federal Government could use the railroad 
free of charge, with Congress setting the rate* for ell other 
business. Had the 6wln plan been adopted and the land sold for 
an average of only *1.25 per acre, it would have, yielded’ the 
builders *27/700 per mile or *7,700 above the estimated coat of
b
construction par mile.
the Gwin plan seemed to strike the fancy of all concerned* 
from its Introduction in 1853 down to 1860 the leading transcon­
tinental railroad bills wore merely variations upon this theme* 
Some changed the sic# of the land grant# length of private cp-
4oration, ox added varying amounts of monetary asalstanco, but
basically oil were the same aa the one pot femtsd by the Sens-
6
to* from California,
The Congress heard many arguments to explain why a txan*- 
continental railroad was necessary, but all could be categor- 
ixed under three major titles, those of political, economic, 
and military. The military reasons given ware associated with 
the bringing ef California closer to the rest of the nation of 
that time. This, was especially strong when the thxaftt of possi­
ble British ox Russian Invasion of California not bandied about, 
Oregon was mentioned in the same vain* The strategic value of 
having a railroad connecting these two American outposts to the' 
rest of the nation would have been extremely important in event
of wax* A railroad as a solution to the Plains Indian problem
T
did not come into consideration until the Civil Wax*
"the political reasons were not <plf# as simple, being 
bound up as they were in the sectional differences prevalent 
during the fifties. Southerners saw a Pacific reed as a means 
of improving the waning strength of the South, Northerners 
envisaged the prospective railroad as an extension of the' al­
ready dominant rail network of the Qhio-Miaeiseippl valley,
Fogel, jg* £ii,, p. 35*
IMA** P» 20.
unlike the Southerner though, the North was split Into cliques
seeking an eastern terminus for the transcontinental far then*
8
selves*
The commercial or'economic considerations were net com­
plex at all* They consisted ef two parts* One, a method ef 
draining off the excess dregs of Society and'putting these 
unfortunate into a frontier environment where they would he 
forced to work in eider to exlstj no explanation was given as 
to hew they would he convinced to go. ted two* a method of
creating'markets, sources of raw materials, ted providing an*.
9
couragement for a-alowly increasing industrial machine.
As the final show dote approached, the "issue before
Congress was never really one of choosing between opposites**
10
a government road or a. private enterprise** All interests in­
volved, both North and South, were either pushing for a govern* 
ment built and supported road, or * privately built end gav* 
ernment subsidized road* A pragmatic attitude seemed to have 
become dominant--with the objective that of getting a trans­
continental railroad- under construction by any acceptable 
method* Further proof of this is seen In the -additional in­
ducements legislated -even after the road had commenced its
sane three arguments can be seen to 
Cong., 2nd Sess.»Vol. 32,pp.2675-8.
** p. <27,
6alothlike movement West* ' Sooiuft# of the lack of settlement 
between th# Missouri Hive* and the PacificCoast, with the ex­
ception of the Mormon area around the Great Salt hake* the
pushing lot a transcontinental at this time his been called ft
It
"premature enterprise." “Premature'*, according to one author­
ity, "that is, when the measuring rod of lie maturity and 
practicality was the willingness of unaided private enterprise,
guided solely by th# search for profits, to undertake the pro- 
13
loot** The railroad was "premature" when first suggested and, 
using th# above definition, premature when it was eventually 
constructed lit 1863-1869. Such ait idea la not ft recent inno­
vations Charles Francis Adams, Jr., was guilty of making a 
similar remark in 187##. lust one year after the completion of 
the Union Pacific. Me felt that there was no urgent need for 
'the Union Pacific at that time because the entire policy of
building the Union Pacific was "based on th# stimulation of ft
14
supply in excess of the natural demand.“ Adams blamed the 
"clamor for it" end. for th# s««d even becoming # reality at 
the time it did# upon public opinion, A Sidelight on Adams end
]*# pp. 99*44*
12
^      I*  » r  *
18
14
Charles F. Adams, Jr., "Railway Problems in.1869," 
Nortfr American Review. CX (January, 1870), p* 116.
bis/statement is that just fourteen years later {1384) 'he was 
to become president of the Union Pacific, after the road had 
reached adolescence.
The Republican Party platform of I860, as had the other
13
three party platforms, celled 'for a transcontinental railroad*' 
Attempts were made during 1861* to fiat a hill through* but the 
setting up of war- machinery proved Of primary Importance. All ' 
of the arguments used dawn through the years Were brought into 
play during the 1862 pre-election session of Congress with re­
newed vigor* Secession gave the North an opportunity to push 
through a bill that was. favorable,' A "binding up the Union® 
theme played a prominent part in. the hearings. Detractors 
■had maintained that within twenty years private capital- would 
build such a road without any assistance. Despite the threat 
of government intervention and- implied destruction of the pri­
vate enterprise system, Congress and. the general public were
unwilling to wait one Congressional session, let alone twenty 
16
years,
The bill that eventually became the Union Pacific En­
abling Act of 1362 mu e*id to have been written in Its origi­
nal form by Henry Bennett of Elmira* New York, who was then 
chief lobbyist.of the Leavenworth, -Pawnee and Hastern Railroad
"1 ' ,
'William PxanfcEornew, KaaSMS A Histgp &ljb& ifyMwE 
{Norman, Oklahoma* University of Oklahoma Press, 19571,Ml
pi I3|g
(of Kansas). Bennett cane to Washington in late 1861 armed 
not only with the bill, but twenty thousand shoves of LP&W
18
stock (pair value one million dollies) to dispense for favors, 
loti* on other individuals who became associated with the Union 
Pacific w«v» also accused of having spent $167,000 for "spe­
cial legal expense* during consideration of the 1862 bill.
A point of information vital to the understanding of a discus- 
sion of the 1862 Enabling Act is that there wave several rail* 
road companies already enjoying corporate life .that were avidly 
interested in becoming a part of or the transcontinenta1 rail* 
road. The Union Pacific was not ope of these— it received its 
life from the 1862 Enabling Act itself. The Mil attempted to 
create a transcontinental system of railroads rather than 
single road across the continent. The and result, it must be 
admitted# was a single line# but this was net the original in­
tent.
The eat provided for a beard of commissioners to estab­
lish a “Union pacific feallroad Company* with directions aa to
18
Hereafter referred to #e the LP&»«
U. S. Cong.. Senate,
IMlnn, 50th Cana.. 1st Session^Senate Baaa* Oocument No 
1887, Testimony of Jamas C. 'liettO, Pol.111, p. 1681. Thi
document hereafter referred to aa Pac.By.Comm.Report.
4i. 45th Cong., 2nd Seas., Vol. VII
pax value a# stack, officers and a board of directore, and the
20
mount of stock to be sold to an individual. The other parti­
cipating roads wore to join the Unto** Pacific at the 186th
21
meridian ox along the Union Pacific route mot of that point.
SB
the other roods and their route* More no foiloust
1. Pacific Railroad of Missouri (later th# Missouri 
Pacific) was to build west from Kansas City, Missouri, across 
th# Kansas and Nebraska prairie to join th# Union Pacific at 
the 100th Meridian in Nebraska’s Platte Valley.
2. LP&W was to build from Leavenworth, Kansas, and eon* 
nect with the Pacific Railroad of Missouri.
3. Hannibal and at, Joseph Railroad (of Missouri) was 
to build west from St. Joseph, Missouri, and meet th# Union 
Pacific at th# 100th Meridian or connect with the Iowa branch 
of that toad coming from Omaha* so long as the Hannibal did 
not exceed 166- miles in length.
4. Sioux City Pacific Railroad was to be constructed 
by the Union Pacific: from Sioux City, Iowa, to the Iowa Branch 
of the Union Pacific at ox east of the 166th Meridian.
5. Central Pacific Railroad was the Western half of the
Appendix 
e
— „   --- 1*. 37th dona,, 2nd ##**,, , _ _
"»w o? theT3nited States", Chap.cxx, p. 382. Here- 
id to as Ret of 1862.
lo
transcontinental toed, It was to bo constructed by a group 
of Californians from, eventually* ion Francisco to the Calif­
ornia -Nevada border.
The Union Pacific Railroad, Iowa branch# was to extend 
from a point across the Missouri River at Council bluffs# Iowa,
up the Platte Valley in Nebraska Territory to the 100th meri- 
23
dian* Fro® the 100th Meridian to the Californla-Nevada 
Border all the participating reads that had reached that point 
ware to build the line connecting with the Central Pacific, .or. 
if lust one of the lines survived it could build on west*
The Act also provided a Means end a reason for build­
ing these roads with a series of lend grants and bond subsi­
dies. A direct grant'of five alternate sections of public 
land per mile of track constructed was to be selected from
within a ten Mile distance of each side of the two hundred
24
foot wide right-of-way. The all# of the land grant was later
25
(1864) doubled and the right-of-way width halved*
The bond subsidy provided* in 1862, a scaled amount, 
depending upon the difficulty of construction. The prairie 
m  low-land subsidy was sixteen thousand' dollars per mile, in
Ibid.. p., 281.
24
IMd. . p. 382.
25
Sonqres'sfonaR Gl'ohe?. 38th Cong., 1st Seas,,. Vol. 34, 
Appendix "laws of the Whited States", Chap* CCXfl, p, 250* 
Hereafter referred to as Act of 1864*
n
the region between th# mountains (Rockies and fierra Nevadas)
thirty-two thousand dollars per mile, and in th# mountains
the payments were *'trebled“or forty-eight thousand dollars
26
per mile.of completed tract* In 1864 this wee further liberal­
ized by transforming the government subsidy bends into a .'Se­
cond mortgage and allowing the railroad companies to issue
first mortgage bonds In an amount equal to the government sub-
2T
sidy per mile, although the company could not issue its first
mortgage bends until after the issuance of the government sub-,
sidy bonds* It In effect doubled the amount of money the
builders could ley their hands upon* This gave them thirty-
two* sixty-four and ninety-air thousand dollars per mile res­
pectively through- the various terrains*
fine# the 1862 Act did not attract enough investors it 
wee necessary to modify the original act in 1864. Another 
reason for ex at least an influence upon this later act was 
the Credit Mobilier of America - construction company extra­
ordinary.
The origin of the Credit Mobilise was based upon a set - 
of rather short sighted, but* for that day normal assumptions. 
They weret
1. All the money to be made out of the Union Pacifict
M i  M  1862. p. 383.JJPJT * ■f’
M l  M  1864. p. 261.
project would he mode ill flit construction of the read*
2. flit toad itself as a l^egitimate business enter* 
prise* would never field a profit*
3. the government offered on immense bonus to- any set 
ef men who built the toed# but only if these men else eon**- 
-irolled the railroad company itself could they control the 
construct!#!! contracts and that# in their profits*
4. the solution was to -put th# control of both com*
panics, railroad and construction ini# th# hand# of on# set 
20
of men*
the failure of the Union Pacific to raise enough money to- do 
its own construction'became apparent by early-1004. forty 
miles of line had been graded# but only-a-few miles of track 
had been. laid. It. wm at this juncture that thomes €*• Mutant* 
then Vice,fresident of the Union Pacific was given-a free; hand.
©urant had started,Ms business-life #«..* member of an 
uncle*#.flour and grain exporting business* He moved from, 
there-.into successful stock brokerage' and- finally; like many a 
visionary promoter of the day into railroad construction and 
Its attendant speculation* ■ Me. built, railroads in Michigan and 
Iowa, and was on#:of th# prim# contractors-fof the Chicago and 
Eo&fckXaland Hail road* .throughout, the##-' .earlier dealing#'he
had been associated with, ox hid working for him, west of the 
persons who were later to become famous financiers and builders
of th# Union Pacific.*
the alternative -that' Durant used* when it was decided 
that the Union Pacific would not construct its wan road, was 
the exhaustive contract construction company. The creation 
of such an organisation was neither new at.but of the ordi­
nary} rather, it was common-plsce In railroad building 'during
30
the period between. 1855-1880. The difference between the 
Credit Mobilise and other railroad construction companies 
seems to have been only in the amount of prefits it was able 
to accrue. The exhaustive contract system was used time and 
again by other construction companies, bat to the Credit Mo­
bilise befell the dubious honor ef being singled out as the 
greatest malefactor. The honor did not fall upon undeserving 
shoulders,
'The amounts received in the form of bend subsidy, Union 
Pacific bonds* and lends sold vary according to the criterion 
used for estimation. The estimates range from a low of forty-
)»
A l l e n  J o h n s - "  M W  Dll**, CL li, 1  A n *  ( S d i  f n r n  1 . B 4 * + i n n n
ai ijpfliiife
01* V., pp, 452-3.
w
D a v i s ,  o p . c l t . . p .  l i t .
eight, million to •.high ef seventy*four million dollars. 
Profits are similarly difficult to determine as records were 
inadequately kept. The estimates varied from slightly over 
eight million to a high of almost forty-four million dollars 
(see Figure No.. l&J*
The very motive behind the building of a transcontinan* 
tel railroad presented an evil. Anytime speed of construction 
is considered paramount over physical and geographic capabi­
lities the resulting cost must he inherently higher# Author­
ities hive estimated that within twenty years after 1662,
private capital and enterprise would have been ready to build
{$j|
the read alone. ' Another estimate was that'If ten years would
have been used to build the road, instead of four, the overall
33
east could have been cut by one-half to two-thirds.
However critical a person might be of the Credit Mobi- 
lier and the people who surrounded it, one thing should be 
kept in mind— it completed the railroad! There was waste.
Fred A. Shannon,
ompany, inc.*
AmericaiGr
Senior
:el. ££.£ii., p. 19s |ewie .Henry Haney. SflMmalgMl
r.vmvgmm*- JMJMJjlg-Mfigft.
WXSCPftS JLfl X9X®#i f 01 • XXg p*. Xlrll»
Fae.ftv.Comm.Report. Vol.Vlli, Testimony of G. M. bodge, 
p. 3919.
FIGURE 1
ESTIMATES. FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, OF 
m o m s  SMS BUILDING the union PACIFIC
Da.M£luarMy. iiwat
1. Wilson Committee (House ef Representatives
Investigating Committee, 1873}, ..........  $23,366,319.81*
2* Rowland Ha*ard. . , . . ,, * * * , , * , , 15,000,000.00**
3. 3. 3, Crawford. , , , . . . . « , 8,141,903.70***
4, Henry Kirk White. . . « « * , . . * . , •, 16,710,432.82+
3, John P» ©avis....... , ................  29,521,213.11++
6. George A. Donely. 13,712,368.00+++
.Rv .Comm .Repox t. p. 65. 
loiand Retard. The Credit Mobiller ef America. (Providence* 
Sidney S. Rider*-' 1881}, pp. 27-29. '
***J, 3, Crawford, The Credit Mobllier of America;, (Boston!
G. W. Calkins and Co., 1880}, pp. 71-72.
. +Henry Kirk White, MMyelery £g ,the Union Pacific Railway. 
(Chicago* Chicago University Press,'1893},; pp. 35-37.
- ++John P. Davis. The Union Pacific Railway. (Chicano* S. C.
Griggs and Co., l i f d l ^ i T m i f S ,  '
+++George Anthony Donely, *Th« Construction of the Union ' 
Pacific Railway hf the Credit Mebilie* of America,0 
(Unpublished Master*s essay, Columbia University, 1958), 
pp. 78-79.
corruption, and mem* profit, but th® objective was reached* 
the result was a transcontinental railroad* If* on the other 
hand* one would look at it with hind-sight end point out the 
ways In which money could have been saved, and only a fair 
profit been allowed* these la an argument for detracting from 
the credit heaped upon the builders, There was a definite 
need for such « railway and the expressions of the heat minds 
of the time verify this* Had the question been pvt off until 
private enterprise had found it profitable to build* the whole 
settlement end history of the West might conceivably have been 
much different*
Ground was broken in early December of 1863, for the 
beginning of the road at a point (near Ninth .end Capital 
Streets} in Omaha, Nebraska Territory* The Chief Engineer, 
Peter bey* for the Union Pacific had platted the toed almost 
directly west from that ideation* but other heads prevailed 
-and the line «a. laid 'out and graded followed the Missouri 
liver south a way* then slanted southwest through, the river 
bluffs toward present day Fapllliea* Nebraska, up along the 
Slkhorn River to Fremont, 'there Joining the Platte River valley, 
and following it wait into Colorado to Julesburg. ®ey and an 
assistant, Grenville Dodge, had surveyed and: sight located the 
prospective route across Nebraska, beginning in 1853 at the 
behest and pay of Henry Parnham and Thomas C. Durant* free­
wheeling builders of the ill-fated Mississippi and Missouri
Railroad Company, then building through Iowa.
The problem that remained unsolved until: the latter 
pert.of thoeCivil War, was to find the' best way through the 
Rooky Mountains. South Pass in Wyoming was the natural rout# - 
used by the travelers on the. Overland (California-Qregon) 
Trill,' This.' route wee not practicable for a railroad because 
it would entail' too steep a grade * the Enabling Acts required 
t grade of no greater than 116 feet rise per milt. It was 
Dodge who found the way.
While crossing the tieina with $ troop of hie cavalry* 
Dodge* then ft General in the u. S. Army, located a pees with 
a ridge that led from the high plains into the Rookies at a 
gradient of only ninety feet per mile. He named the location 
Sherman Pass in honor of his commending general during the 
War— William T, Sherman.
t, ■
Once into.the mountains it became.apparent that if the 
route was to be built it would require a major engineering 
triumph* The successful completion celled for the erection 
of innumerable trestles and bridges to cross and edge around 
prlclpitous cliffs and the blestlag and chipping out of -tunnels 
through craggy heights too steep-or difficult togo ever, 
Originally the intention was.to angle the read down into Colo­
rado and sweep through Denver," the center of Rocky Mountain 
mining at the -time*, and then to shoot back up .into Wyoming 
aiming at the Great Salt Lake Basin. Investigation revealed
18
that this route into Denver would be too difficult, expensive, 
end time-consuming. The desire to reach the Solt Lake Basin 
end Mormon tegion we* not given up though— this wee the only 
really populated eve* between the Missouri River and:the Mast 
Coast, at construction time.
The construction halted with the lass of Peter fief in 
December, 1864, a* the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific.
As previously Indicated, Dey had been associated with Thomas 
Durant in low* in the early fifties. It was at the direction 
of Durant that 'Day made surveys into Nebraska Territory and 
beyond in 1863. These surveys -gave Durant and M s  associates 
an advantage in formulating and putting over the Platte Valley 
route for the Union Pacific. This association between Durant 
and Oey nonetheless closed in lata 1864,
The reason for Say leaving is confused by 'differing 
stories circulated afterhis departure. 'Day claimed that he 
left because he could not be partner to the "exhaustive con­
tract" Idea which Durant .and the Credit Mobilier people had 
inaugurated on the- first 100 miles of "the Union Pacific to- ba 
constructed. This Movie contract (so-called because the "con­
tractor" of record tees H. M, Hoxie) was written so that the 
void was to pay" sixty thousand dollars par mile of completed 
track* Day had estimated 'the- coat of building that section at 
thirty- thousand dollars pgr Mia* for this reason Boy wrote 
to Union Pacific President General John A. Mr. on December 7,
it
1864, statings
*2 do ttoi* approve of the contract for building the 
first hundred miles from Omaha .wist# and. 2 do not care 
to have my name so connected with the railroad that 2 
shall appear to endorse the contract.*34
Grenville M. Podge* who succeeded Day, told a different 
story. Dodge reported Oey’s resignation of "...the beet posi­
tion in hie profession this country has offered to any man," 
occurred because the Company would not build along the route 
he wanted. Podge could have ratlonalired the reason for 
Dey»s departure in order to accept 'the post himself.
Grenville Malian Dodge (born April 12* 1331) was m  
almost Horatio Alger-like character. He rose from the obscur­
ity of poor New England farm-life near Denver, Massachusetts, 
to become one of tha most distinguished personages in tha 
civil engineering field, although much distinction came to him 
from his other endeavors.
Dodge was of that generation that reached adulthood 
during the time railroads were starting their first wave of 
construction. He received his degree as a military and civil 
engineer In the early summer of 1851, and immediately followed 
two classmate-friends to Illinois— scene of tha greatest sail-
.eM'iwwM'iwiieg
. , „ Stewart M, Holbrook, 2 M  JlSSX M  Mtfil&fifl hf.li.mds
(Haw York* Crown Publishers, 1947), p, 1 6 7 7 :
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road activity. In the course of the .neat few years, he joined 
at} Illinois Central Railroad engineering patty* where ha work* 
ed under Peter Beyi later surveyed along with Day tot tha 
Mississippi and Missouri Railroad from Davenport to Iowa City. 
Dodge then took himself a wife and settled in Council Bluffs, 
Iowa, ha a result of -hie reconnaissance and surveying be­
tween the Missouri and West Coast he drew up a map and guide 
booklet, showing the heat camping stops on the way went* that 
was distributed through hi*, outfitting store in Council Bluffa* 
His reputation became to great by 1859, that alien an Illinois 
politician, looking m m  s q m  property he held mortgage to in 
Council Bluffs* asked who could best discuss -proposed railroad 
routes through the West, Dodge was the man. .Dodge described 
the discussion as one in which his brain was completely "picked" 
of *11 the Information he possessed on Western routes. This 
Illinois politician remembered his conversation with Dodge 
after the Illinoian became President of the United State# in 
1861. -@odge maintained' years later, rather immodestly, that 
this 1859 conversation with Lincoln was responsible for the4' *
choosing of the Platte Valley route for' the transcontinental, 
After the-' outbreak at the Civil far. Dodge an* caught
up in the conflict. Because he bed organized a company of 
mliltli- in Council Bluffs, he W W  •hie to secure himself a 
commission a• a colonel in the Fourth Iowa Volunteers. Wounded 
beige in battle, the first early in the war at the Battle of
Pea Ridge and again on Sherman*s March, he served -out the lest 
p«rt of -the we* heeding up the Array*s Separtment of the Mis* 
souri with the responsibility of keeping the Indians in check.
It was a« * Major General of Volunteers in the lottos 
poet that he loft the Amy and became Chief Engineer of the 
Union'' Pacific in May, 1866, he' had accepted the position lit 
January of that year upon the condition that he would have 
complete autonomy to build the toad *hii own way.* Whether 
Sedge was his own nan e» not, he 'did take. the job .and five 
guidance to the construction of the seed that had been with* 
out' the services of Day fas m m  * yeas* Heproc ended to 
speed up the building program to such a degree that three 
yeas* -end ten days after assuming the. position, the sail* of 
the Central Pecific end the Union Pacific were wedded on the 
Salt Lake desert.
the construction of a railroad across m  unsettled 
section of the continent involved a number of major problems, 
eachof which by Itself could have halted things had it gone 
unsolved. The biggest problem -sms that of geographic isola­
tion of the rail head. Because the nearest railway connection 
WO* at St. Joseph, Missouri, the us* of river steamboat was
Jacob a. Perkins, frail.*. Rail* and Wars The life of 
General S*J|* Podae. {Indianapolis1Bobbs-Merril1 Co., Pub­
lishedunder auspices of The Historical, Memorial end Art 
Separtment of lowa, 1929), p. Iff*
necessary to supply the construction crews *t Omaha, This 
method of transportation woe handicapped by the necessity of 
.hauling a whole year's supplies within the three-to-four* 
month periodwhen the Missouri River was navigable. Other 
supplies, particularly timbers were hauled across Iowa at « 
Very high cost by freight wagon from the end of the North 
Western Railroad building across the Iowa prairie. The "big 
push1 of track construction came after Council Bluffs was 
connected with the East by tail* which allowed far more in 
the way of quantity to be carried end at a much lower price 
'than the tonnage '.handled many times vie steamboat.
The Meins Indians presented a formidable obstacle 
else* They had taken advantage of the distraction of the 
Civil War to go on several rampages in Nebraska and Colorado 
during the early sixties. The constant Indian threat to sur­
veyors, graders and tracklayers -wee partially alleviated by 
help’ the Army provided. Up until the time Bodge left the 
Army he was responsible far the eradication of troublesome 
Indians in the Platte Valley. Because of his friendly eon* 
tacts In the .Army this service was maintained during the Ip* 
tire construction pealed.. Complementing this aeaviee were the 
laborers hired by the Casement brothers {General John .and 
Baniel), tha traek-leying and grading contractors for the 
Union Pacific. Moat of the man working on. tha Union Pacific 
were 'Civil far veterans and*, these men under' the leadership
of many former commissioned and non-commissioned officers 
serving as foreman and superintendents, made « very effective 
Indian fighting force that nevex worked vary fax from their 
stacked arms*
The shortage of men during tha Civil War years was 
ovexcome somewhat by tha importation of Irish laborers to 
carry on what could be dona under tha circumstances, the 
shortage of man was closely coupled with tha geographic iso­
lation—*solved eventually by 'tha and of 'the 'wax and the com­
pletion s#'« railroad into Council Bluffs in 1867. At the 
time whan a maximum effort was being expended to complete the 
road (1868-69} there were "some 12,000 men...directly employed 
bn the Union Pacific**
Many of the men who came to help with the building 
stayed only long enough to save sufficient money to buy -land 
near the railroad right-of-way* '•ethers* 'lust enough to bring 
their family from the East ■out to the Middle West* Still 
others'were of the rolling-stone variety who, when the-Union 
Pacific was completed, moved down to Texas to build the Texas 
and Pacific or north - to build the Northern Pacific. Those 
wise probably the sons of men who had built the canals in the 
Middle Atlantic states■and Ohio Valley during the eighteen-
< , 24
thirties and -forties. These were the men who made the ”#nd- 
o~track” camps the lend* brawling, notorious places they were. 
Murderers, rapists# card sharps# bar-room brawlers# ex-eon- 
viets, and even teed meat they ell had eat shill in common—  
railroad building, that they did when -they were net working 
was their business, but when, the workbsll clattered their 
souls belonged to Grenville bodge end the Casement Brothers 
end they worked!
The whole nation celebrated a* the silver sledge (edited 
to the telegraph) smacked the golden end silver spikes into 
the,tie of polished wood on May IQ, 1869, ftspreeenta|pve« of 
the government, -the officers of both Union and GentralPaeific 
Railroads, the press# construction foremen and laborers, ell 
cheered as the cow-catchers of the two locomotives, one heeded 
west .and the other .east# touched and champagne bottles were 
smashed on 'them, Mot all' the champagne was .wasted in such 
pursuits. They were'done, • continent had been spanned# East 
had met test, Almost seven years from the time the 1862 Act 
had been passed the roads were Joined, The work was not com­
pleted, however S it was almost another year of. strengtheai'ng# 
filling# replacing and rebuilding before the entire route was 
accepted by the government inspectors*
for use as a means of saving the Union it came a little 
late, but the.road did help bring the Indian 'Wars t o  a close. 
To serve as a moans of c o m m u n i c a t i o n  between the c o a s t s ,  this
if did5 it cut travel time from months to days. Serving at 
a means of distributing fhemsnufactured goods of the East 
m m  the mid-Sest and West, §» a method of putting Western 
raw materials into the last— another success. The Union Pi* 
cific did not solve ell of .the country** ilia socially, eco­
nomically, or politically, in feet, it helped create some.
The new railroad stood as a great achievement of man over tha 
elements, as a step in puffing the peopled of the country in 
* little closer contact, Md, it made a email group of people 
immensely rich.
The estimates of profit aide by the people in control 
of the Credit Mobilier, ranged from a low of approximately 
$8 ,00 0 , 0 0 0 to a high of nearly $44,000,000. The only figure 
that presents a breakdown with any authenticity la the high­
est one, backed by the prestige of government subpeon* and. a 
complete government commission investigation. The Pacific 
hallway Commission conducted an investigation in moat of the 
Important railroad and financial centers, bringing before it 
the biggest' names in railroad operation, finance and construe** 
fion. The Commission accountant reported, from aubpoonaed 
Union- Pacific and personal accounts of the individuals Involved, 
that the total profits made from the construction of the Union 
Pacific amounted. - to $43,929,328,34.-
. - Pae.Ry.Comm.Report. VqI.VXX, Report of Accountant - 
william calKoun, p. 4861,
Between 1889 end 1875 the Union Pacific faced two prob­
lems thit wet# to eventually bankrupt the railroad. The first 
was tha problem of bow payment of the subsidy bonds, furnished 
by the government should be net* Solution to this had to waif 
until the 1890*8, after many sots of Congress, railroad pro­
posals, and court decisions. The other problem— Uay Gould—  
was a recurring one also. He bought into the Union Pacific 
twice. Once in 1873, only to leave in the early eighties,
Slid again in the letter.part of the same decade to complete : 
his work.of destruction. There' were periods, nonetheless, 
during’ which the Union Pacific was able to operate fundamentally 
as a railroad# providing freight and passenger service along 
its route# without interference from the financial meandering* 
of Gould and his cohort*,
The period from 1869 until 1873 was such a period. Be­
tween 1869-71, the same people who .had been .financially tea* 
ponsible for the construction of the road were still connected 
with it. Rapacious Thomas Burant had taken "his silver spike 
from the completion ceremonies and left the scene, Still **- 
msining ware the Massachusetts shovel manufacturers, Oliver 
and ©ekes Ames, the former as president of.the road and "the 
latter as an. ia^ or'tant member of the beard of directors— still 
in Congress unsullied by the upcoming Credit Mobilier Investiga­
tion of 1873. With the Ames brothers, yet another important 
Credit Mobilier trustee, Sidney Dillon* remained on the. board
®f ■dlyectet*. Grenville Dodga and the Casement brothers 
hid. 9m #  on to other railroad construction, ©edge to Texas to 
work on the T#M9« and Pacific.
The building group retained control of the Onion Paci­
fic until January 1871. 1% art* at this time that the company
was faced with * floating debt of five million'; dollars that 
was to 'imitwrd in just three months, secured by collateral 
with a market value about one-third less then the loan, end 
tin million dollars of income bend* maturing between 1872 and 
1874, Union Pacific stock prices slid down to * quotation
of 9, income bonds to 3at. and the land grant bond* (allegedly
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to be paid off from sale of lands} to bf« Two groups of 
capitalists fought for control of the Union Pacific during 
this period above conditions} both groups hoped to use the 
road as the completing link to * truly transcontinental rail­
road system.
The first group,, whose immediate success later gave 
way to tha second group, could be fairly described as the 
Pennsylvania Railroad party. It was made up #f Them** Scott, 
thaii President of the Pennsylvania, Andrew Carnegie, and. George 
M. Pullman. In 1871, this group took control of the Union 
Pacific, elected Scott president and provoked a mangeris1
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struggle that resulted in March* 1872* in the second group 
winning control in * proxy battle. This second group was 
associated with Cornelius Vanderbilt and the- Mew York Central 
Railroad* fhi. New York Central depended too heavily upon ear. 
loadings from Chicago end, the West (meaning freight going last 
from Omaha from the. Union Pacific) to allow the Pennsylvania 
control of another of the Pacific roads, the Pennsylvania, 
through its President. Scott* already had a wedge in the 
Kansas Pacific heard of diraeter#, Control of the Union Paci­
fic, 'by 'the. Pennsylvania, would allow diversion of east hound, 
freight over the Kansas Pacific to. Kansas City, through to 
ft* Louis end the Pennsylvania.
thus the victorious party led by Horace f* Clark* son- 
in-law of Cornelius Vanderbilt, saved part of the transcontinen­
tal business for their Eastern reil Hne— but at a tremendous 
coat to themselves for waiting, the price of the road's stock 
had been driven up m  high that Clark paid an average of 30s 
for hie atock, which had sold at 9 joat a few months before*
Clark remained as President of theUnion Pacific until hie -
40 , •*
death lnl873. Jay Gould*a purchase of the Onion Pacific 
stock* put into the market by the administrator# of-the Clark 
estate* brought another ehangeinthe management structure of 
the transcontinental.
■ ~w '*•*- I’m *e Universityaaer
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Jay (born Jason) Gould came of upstate New York Scot­
tish-Puritan stock* There seemed to be some confusion as to
41
tbe year of his birth (1836 or 1837). but the day was agreed 
upon as May 27. foil of a ne'or-do-well farmer he worked on 
his father's farm until he was fourteen, assisting a local 
storekeeper with bookkeeping to earn enough money ip order to 
remain in school. His next atop was Beochwood Seminary, where 
he was noted for hla seriousness of study and his unfriendll- 
ness, while at Beochwood he authored an essay that was on* 
titled, according to one source. "Honesty is.: the Best Policy}**
it stressed conscience and conscience alone' as the control of
42 • '
individual action. Xt was while still St Beechwood that he 
took his first real job— one that gut him out into the world.
Serving as in assistant to a surveyor making a county 
map. Gould taught himself surveying. When hie employer was 
unable to complete the 'map. Gould «^ d.' and received the profit 
for the entire Job# Me aeon moved .into the tannery business, 
but left it shortly-losing his half interest in' it to the 
heirs of hie partner rather ’than allow an investigation into
Gould's year OfTbirth, oar*
H. Talbott 'and
Robert X, Warshow, lav Gould} fhm fiery, pf a 
Verfe* Greenberg, 19281* p. 24. "
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the suicide of that partner, •
Moving to New fork City* the twenty-on* yea* aid Gould
married the daughter at a wealthy grocer. Hi* fathax-in-law
pat Gould to wort investigating the operation of a xailxdad
in which the familyownad a considerable number of thereat the
road we* turned over to a larger one at a $130,ooo profit in
a -{Batter of months, the speculator was boxnj Gould was to 1
never b* without a railroad or at least engaged in financial
44
speculation frtwa 'that day until hia death,
G©uld*s progression begani fren railroad speculation 
he moved into building reads via the'printing press# later# 
becoming an actual builder, using reel tie* end etee'l. His' 
first venture into th* high finance of railroading occurred 
during the fight ever' the Sri* Hailroad.
Acting as an agent fat' various clients, Gould control- 
led numerous Erie proxies and was drawn by. @ani*l Brew into ' 
opposition to Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt to a factional 
fight ever the control of that railroad, the trie fight be­
ing the beet known case of capitalistic connivance on record, 
time will net 'be devoted to a blow by blow description of the 
strife, Suffice it to say that each of the contending groups
.  __j,** pp. 29*43.
|»» PP. 51-34,
used every known device to grasp control of tit# road iam
the others bribing of stockholders, legislators, end judges,
“watering" the stock, injunction end counter injunction,
end lest and net least of importance* one of the largest
stock market battles in history, the team ef Prow. Gould,
John S, Elaridge, end James {Jubilee Jim) Fisk won the
donnybrook. Gould and Fiak turned on the others in their
4S
group.end wound up in eenitel ell by them®elves.
Controlling the -ftfle from |i®8 until lit#- in 1872, , 
Gould acted as president of the line and was in charge of . 
expending it info Cleveland, Ohio, and the oil districts 
of Pennsylvania, during tha same period he was responsible 
im in increased watering of Erie stock, raising of the 
floating debt to an unmanageable figure, and a “systematic' 
looting® of the treasury. 'With Erie stack-at, the highest 
quotation In years, Gould unloaded $ major portion of his 
holdings in order to delve into ether speculations, the 
Union Pacific being one of then*
Grodineky, pp.cit.. pp.35-53, 
** pp.71-74 and John Moody
of America Series, voX» 3 8, 1New Havant the Tale university 
frees, 1919)« p, 88,
With tha purchase of the Clark shares in the Union Pa­
cific in 1873, Gould did not immediately begin bln usual man­
ipulations. ilia first step was ant of assistance to the road 
during the Crash of 1873. In conjunction with tha directors 
of tha Union Pacific ha was able to transform tha huge {fiat'
million dollars) floating debt into longer-term bonds*, matur-
1 ' 47' " ' ’ 1 ' . . - ■ ■ ■
log In 1893. Gould himself did not officially become a mambas
‘"4#
of tha road*# board until 1874,: and it we* 1877 before ha 
actually became manipulative with its fortunes.
The Union Pacific had come a groat distance..from the. 
germ of a thoyght In th# minds of several visionaries^ to a 
bright Iron ribbon across the Great Plain* and through the 
Rookie* some 1,038 mile* in' length by 1875* it served, an area 
that was just beginning to come to life. The fifteen year* 
between 1875 and' 1898 were to see the end of the Frontier in 
America and the Union Pacific had a* much to do with bringing 
this about as any other one factor. The read was completed, it 
could provide a greet service to- the people along Its route,
.but it was in the hands of that arch corporate destroyer— .
Jay Gould,
Pas.Rv.Comm,Report, Vol. 1* Testimony Of Jay Gould* 
48". . "" ■ ' .
Ibid,., p* '447#
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CHAPTER XX
THE M B A S  PACIFIC AND I5ENVER PACIFIC RAILWAYS
) '
The sister road of the Union Pacific was already enjoy­
ing corporate existence when the stroke of President Lincoln** 
pen Joined their destinies in the 1862 Enabling Ant* The route
' A-of th* Leavenworth, 'Pawnee and Western Railroad whs1 to he 
constructed from Leavenworth to Lawrence,'Kansas, and from 
th*re connecting with th* Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad 
that was to run from a point opposite St. Joseph, Missouri, on 
th* Missouri River to the Union Pacific lino at# or any prac­
tical point east of# the IQOth Meridian— so long as the Hanni-
. 2 
bel end St. Joseph line was no longer then,100 miles. A
supplemental .Act passed by Congress in 1864 provided that the. 
100th Meridian was to be the western-most limit of any govern* 
ment land grant or subsidy and also that should the Union 
Pacific quit building before that point was'reached the Kansas 
road could continue on until it met the Central Pacific, The 
ambitious men baching the Kansas read were wore-than content 
■with this proviso, ee Kansas at this tine was scene of a great 
deal of railroad speculation.
When Kansas became a State in 1861# it had sufficient
Hereafter referred to a* the IMH,
2
See Chapter 1, p. 9.
population to warrant on* railroad 406 miles in length— and 
no-.ffiore*»if it were to he a "paying* {successful) road. At
that time there were 1,320 miles of rail lines projected by
8
railroad companies already incorporated. Although 1,100 rail*
read companies 'war# chartered by the Territory m  by the state
4
of Kansas only two hundred ever laid any track. No other 
middle border state could boast, however, as Kansas could by
1685# that there wee not a single farm in the eastern half of
,5
the state that was more than twenty miles from a railroad!
In 1870 there were 1,234 miles of railroad in Kansas} 'by 1880,
that figure increased to 3,104 end ten-years later it reached
. i-
8,763. It was during these years that- the average Kansan far­
mer acquired large acreage .end cama to specialise in one or 
two cash crops, He was dependent' upon the railroads to .carry 
these crops to market end bring in the manufactured implements 
which he needed.
The tP&JS# chartered by the Territorial Legislature of 
Kansas, was like most corporations 'in that-it had many stock­
holders} for ell practical purposes# however# it was controlled 
by four men# James' C. Stone# J. H, - MeQowall# Colonel A, J,
33h®#s Humphrey# *tfc» Railroad* of Kansas Histari
cal Society Transactions. Vol.III* 1883-5, p. 461,
Humphrey, gp. clt.. p. 402.
2ornow* jyg, sM,,.P* 135.
?
Isaacs, and General Thomas Swing. It was this group ft! iP&d 
backers who were responsible for the Act of 1862*
This group hod arranged for the distribution of 83,160 
shares of WOW stock ($4,158,000 per value) from e "special 
fund* to insure the passage of the 1852 Act. Shares of this 
stock wont to certain prominent people# according to a list 
presented during an investigation of the Pacific Railways in - 
188?, IP&tf lobbyist,: J. €. Stono, who apparently handled the 
distribution, would not admit the.list was authentic, although 
admittedly it was In his,hand-writing. The three names that 
stood out as having received the largest amounts of stock 
were *T. Stevens,* *Gen, J, H.iane," and *S« C. Pomeroy." 
Pomeroy supposedly received a total of four thousand shares# - 
Stevens, 4,100 and lane, 9,400. this was an obvious refer­
ence to Thaddeus Stevens, the leader at that time# of the 
Radical Republicans in the House of Representatives, the other 
two, lane and Pomeroy, were then. United States Senators from 
Kansas, During his testimony, Stone was asked if it had not 
surprised him that Stevens 'had been involved} his an&wef»%%s
that at his age "nothing would cause me to be surprised very 
9
much," He added that the stock distribution was not to have
Pac.Rv.Coeim.Reoort. Vol.Ill, Testimony of «I. C. Stone, 
p. 1595,
8
ibid.. pp, i&9?«*98.
Ibid.. p. 168?.
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bean considered only for th* 1862 Act, but for addition*! 
legislation that LP&W promoters knew would b» needed o.t later 
dates.
Unlike th* Union Pacific, the i$&W underwent name
changes from tine to tine, the original nan*, th* ieavenworth.
Pawnee and Western Railroad Company, was adopted in 1855, when
the first Kansas territorial legislature issued the corporate
charter*' the 1P&W was succeeded by the Union Pacific Bail-
12
way Company, Eastern Division on dune 6, 1863, because the
Act of 1862 required that the tP&W have completed at least
100 Mies • of track Cep to prescribed standards) within two
years after the Act was Signed. By June of 1863, the LP&W
13
had built exactly no miles of road* the Act Of 1864 trans­
ferred the right of the tP&W to connect with the Pacific Bail- 
read at the 100th .Meridian to th* Union Pacific,'Eastern divi­
sion, A1 Change in ownership had resulted also, with .Stone and
14
his group being replaced by JohnC. Fremont end Samuel Halieii. 
Almost the entire road was to be built under the name Union' 
Pacific, laetern Division.
: 10
Ibid.* p. 1613.
leonaxd ». Thompson, "The Hietery of Railway Oevelopment 
in Kansas,” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. State University 
of Iowa, Iowa-City, 1942), p. g,
2H*re*ft*r referred to a* th* Union Pacific, •astern . 
Division.
Thompson, fi£>.£li*, p.433 14Pac,ftv.Comm.Report. p.54.
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In March, 1669, the name of the road was again changed,
this tint to the Kansas Pacific Railway Company--the name it
1§
kept until th* Consolidation in 1383, A possible *******-for 
th* last change in name of the road was an attempt, extending 
over # period from August,.1388 to April, 1870, to interest
the Congress in extending the toad to fan -Francisco and fan
■It
iisto* California, through the Colorado "Mineral Belt." the
road had reached the 133th Meridian end was eligible for no
more federal land grants at bond subsidies under the existing
Enabling Acts*
The Congress had reserved four million acres of lend,
far railroad lend grant usage#--when-statehood was granted to 
17
Kansas, Th* State itself held an addition*! one-half million 
acres "for the support of the common schools" under th* Wyan­
dotte Constitution# hut a later Legislature was able to cir­
cumvent th# intention of the earlier proviso and "donate" the
18
one-half million acres to "internal improvement." The Kansas 
Pacific, or its predecessors, did not receive all of the above 
land as there were many railroads in the state# all' trying
Thompson, m*J*il«* P* 10.
Ibid., p. .433, The fee,Rv.Coare.Report. p. 34# makes not* 
of legislation enacted 'July 3, 1866,referring to the "Kansas 
Pacific .Railroad**
17
lornow, ag. cit.« p, 137,
18
Thompson# sat., cit., pp. 27-3,
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tm e share.
The aid received from counties, townships, end cities 
was ait innovation in Kansas although it had been common in 
the last even during the canal-building #*** later the early 
railroads els# btnefitied. In Kansas it became a fine art*
Bond Issues were exchanged for company stock* the Kansas Pa­
cific received $960,000 all told in such aid from cities,.
' 19
counties and townships. The stipulation we** naturally,
that the road would "come through" the area that donated the
aid, in addition local eltixens purchased stock to an amount
of one million dollars* again, to secure th* railroad for their 
21
community. The .amount of money involved was close to two 
million, dollars, .It would be difficult to estimate the num­
ber of miles, such practices took the toad .out of its way, but
the attitude of th# builders was one of seeking .immediate
profits from the construction of the road rather than over the
long rang* of operating a successful railroad. ,
Aa in the building of the Union Pacific, the construe-
Thompson* gg. cit.. p. 427j Zornow, s&. cit.. p. 133,
SHI
' In some cases this practice caused the railroad to change 
the location of 'the surveyed right-of-way, making some towns ' 
prosper end others wither and die, for an interesting study of 
this" situation, see "Soma of the lost Towns of Kanaka," Kansas 
State Historical Society.Collectlona.Vol.XII {1911-12},P P .426-71.
21
lorno*., , m » £l£*. P. 13?«
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tion of th# Kansas Pacific (earlier IP&W and Union Pacific, 
Eastern Division) was carried out by th# exhaustive contract 
system. There was a slight refinement used by th# Kansans 
that allowed less notoriety then that received by th# Credit 
Mobilier, The subterfugsuaed was the changing of the cone 
struetion company name from- tine' to tine* without markedly 
changing the make-up of the company membership, The first 
contract was given to Hunt end Buggiest the second wee handled
by ferry end Company! the third# which completed the road, wee
2M
ft. M. Shoemaker end Company.
The problems feeing: the builders of the Kansas .reed 
were in no way similar to the ones faced by the Union Pacific. 
Even if th# original route had been followed, 'that of connect* 
ing with the Union Pacific at the 100th Meridian, the road 
would still have bean easy to construct. The route as con­
structed was difficult only in the area approaching Denver and 
even here there was nothing'to compare with, the Union Pacific*# 
Cheyenne to Salt lake route. With the exception of 'the few 
miles (lees than one hundred} of mountains around. Denver the 
entire Kansas Pacific line was built across the Kansas Plains. 
Geography was not the only advantage.
Kansas City and St. Joseph! Missouri.# .were both eon* 
Dieted to the last by rail# In transportation faollities - then#
. Thompson, pp. cit., p. 434# 44th Pac.ftv .Comm, Report.
Vol.VII, Report of Accountant— Wiiliaa Calhoun, p* 4870.
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ill# Kansas Pacific had the advantage of being only across the 
Missouri River:from net' one, bet two sources ©f supply. This 
would have allowed th# Kansas Peclfie to operate wlth a anil* 
let inventory of construction supplies had they been so inclined, 
Which lends to the question of why the Kansas Pacific was so 
slow in getting Its line completed*.
''the Mi'Ot; problem was th# same as 'the Union Pacific had 
experienced in early years*-* lack of fish capital. As men­
tioned previously, the LPKW never did construct Any track?
John C. Fremont And Samuel Hallett were hampered by a shortage 
of'personal funds,.so the Union Pacific, Eastern Division while 
owned by them constructed only about forty miles of rood, 
the Freraont-Hallett partnership seemed to be based
upon*
1, Fremont’s money— $2O3,O0O used to pay for the. 
surveys made by M M  end tome boo million acres of lend, th#
! 8 1  
total: asset#, of the MA$i
2. Hallett*a engineering end promotional talent— the 
engineering talent was negligible 'but there seemed, to be a 
good dealof the promoter in Hallett.
When Fremont and Hallett took possession of the road s 
construction contract wee already in effect,. having been let
Vol. Vil, Testimony of John C
41
%  the previous LP&W owners. The new owners proceeded to
ignore this contract end to let a new one through two deeds
of trust to Hunt end ftugglea, The two deed# of trust were
let Just'’ fifteen- days apart (June it end July 1* 1863) end
were for bends valued at $5,760,000 end $7,200,000 respectively,
the bends were secured by "road built end to be built* as well
' M
•s by lends of the company.° # sub-contract was let to Met- 
lift which provided for the construction of forty- Miles of 
track between Leavenworth and Lawrence, Kansas. Whan the. 
people 'of Leavenworth demanded exorbitant prices for their 
lend end supplies because they thought their city wee .-the only 
place from which a railroad could start west across Kansas, 
Hallett proved that Leavenworth was not the only piece end 
Moved ell the property of the Union Pacific, eastern toivision 
to Wyandotte (now pert of Kansas city), Hanses, end proceeded 1%
to build from there a lib# distance of forty miles to -Lawrence* 
if profits were to be made, they would not toe made by person* 
unassociated with the railroad or its constructors!
Halleti’s promotional talents were best exhibited toy 
the methods he used in securing, rails’ for the* forty mile sec­
tion from Wyandotte to Lawrence. He got the iron rolls toy
Thomason, op. £^1., p. 433* -
telling the manufacturer that the road was graded and ties 
laid# neither of which was tana# and that the government bonds 
would be forthcoming when the iron was delivered {another un­
truth). He borrowed fifteen thousand dollars from a St.Louis 
banker. John 0* Perry, by reporting .-that the line wee graded, 
tied, end the-iron paid for* In this fashion he was able to 
transport hie borrowed rails to Wyandotte and atari his rail­
road construction.
Unfortunately Hallett was .to bp,denied the pleasure of 
celebrating the completion of the forty-mile segment of trick. 
His chief engineer* JU C. Taleott, hid been reporting poor 
building 'practices on the road by letter to President Lincoln.
When Hallett discovered' this* he- fired Taleott}' Taleott fired
ST..........
beck* with a repeating rifle* killing Hallett* This allowed 
the -it. Louis banker* terry* to step in as president of the 
company and Fremont began to he shunted aside. By December of 
1864 he had sold out Ms interest for hie original $203,000 
investment, ferry and Company finished the Hillett aub-con- 
tract on the fatty miles to .Lawrence and gat the read accepted 
by government inspectors so that subsidy band* were issued 
October 28, 1865.
26
TeailIbid.. pp. 436-7 and . 
many of John t. Usher, p. 16!
Report
ibid.. pp. 437-9,
Sftl '
, . iMi** P.- 440 andJEaa.gy.Sjyss.RiEsli. Vol.VII, Testimony
of John C. Fremont, p. 3847.#
With the abdication of Thomas Hart Benton*a son-in-law, 
Fremont, the fortunes of the Kansas Pacific Cat this time, 
still the Union Pacific, Eastern Division} wars in the hands 
of a group of St, louis capitalists led by the- banker Perry. 
It ties, this group who finished the read# although Peary did' 
hot retain hie supremacy es the largest shareholder.
the serious wort of construction on the road began in
m
the summer of 1869, the branch from ieavenworth to tawxence, 
started that summer, was completed the following May. In the 
meantime, the main line was continued on west reaching Port 
Riley in October of 1866. . the next two years saw 268 miles - 
completed from fort Riley to Sheridan* Manses* where work 
was halted for over » year. Sheridan (mile-post 409) was near 
the 109th Meridian, the point at which the government subsidy 
bonds ran out. After the failure of the company to interest 
the Congress in an additional road -to California, probably 
through Union Pacific pressure, the Kansas Pacific (so named 
after December, 1869) continued building without federal bond 
subsidies. There was assistance from the States of Kansas and 
Colorado in the form of land grants to encourage the comple­
tion of a. railroad to Denver.
Pac.Rv.Comm.Report, Report of ^ earaisaienees, p. 55
$ 0 .......
Thompson, ££. cit., pp.442-5.
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By April, 1870, theroad extended to Kit Carson, Colo­
rado, end early in September of that sane year Denver was
reached, making « total of 638 miles front Sanaa* City (formerly
US-
Wyandotte), Kansas, to Denver.
Mile building across Me.Sanaa* prairie the railroad 
had encountered a problem not experienced by the UhionPaclfic. 
Many towns had grown dp in Kansas, especially in that part of 
the State east of the 100th Meridian, and each wanted to be 
“on* the new railroad that wi* coming through, feme were will* 
ting to pay fat’ the privilege while others exerted political , , 
pressure. One such Incident occurred in connection with 
Lawrence and Topeka.
38 '
Hallett hid demanded $300,000 to enter Lawrence. Uni* 
ted State* Senator lame* H.'lane, of Kansas, fought to have 
the Union Pacific, Eastern Division enter both Lawrence and 
Topeka without any payment and actually secured Congressional 
legislation authorising the toad through those towns. Hallett 
still refused until Lane decided that Hallett should be re­
quired to remove every log and stump (used to save rock ballast) 
from M e  new roadbed, unless the line entered both cities* In ■
Pac.By.Coma.Report. Vol. 1, Testimony of Artemas H.
Holmes, p» I20*
3al
M i * i  P.- 428,
* matter of days* Hallett informed lane of the road’s inten-
I ’ ’
tlon of going through Lawrence and Topeka.
Another source claimed that this same incident, which 
caused the road to bypass the town of Xndienola, Kansas, was 
caused by 'the people,of Topeka, making "the railroad promoters 
an offer they could not refuse.» When the toad by-passed , 
Indianola by three miles the people In that community actually 
moved their town to Topeka*
Other towns were laid, out and constructed for the sole 
purpose of profiting from, the end-of-track business opportu­
nities. ..Such a town was Rome, Kansas, one mile west of fort 
Hays, where William F» (buffalo Bill}.Cody and a William 'Rose 
started a general Store in Hay,, IS#?* Buffalo Bill was in­
strumental in the promotion of the town end it soon enjoyed 
the end-of-track boom previously noted on the. Union Pacific. 
Within one week the town had grown to a population of'over 
five hundred, within a month to two thousand* M  Its peak, 
the citizens of Rome were mostly "business man, soldiers*.
railroad graders, gamblers, hunters, cut-throats, end proati- 
34
tutes." like the boom town* on the Union Pacific, .Rowe soon 
lost its population to the next end-of-track further west,
“Some tost Town* in Kansas, * Kansas Historical Society 
SallafeMan*, Vol. XII (1911-12), p. 4 2 8 . .........
P* 439*
but unlike * number of the Union Pacific towne, Mem# disap­
peared— no on# stayed.
Of the Kansas Pacific*® 638 Mi# length* 394 miles 
were constructed - from Kansas City to the 106th Meridian with 
the assistance of federal land grants, like those given the 
Union Pacific end a bond subsidy of sixteen thousand "dollars . 
per mile* The Denver extension (from 100th .Meridian -to Den­
ver)* a distance of 244 Alias was constructed without any '
35
federal.aid.
Despite being well over one-half as long as the Union
Pacific it had a total capitalisation of only 832,088,950.
This consisted of $9,437,950 In stock Odd $22,651,000 in bonds
36
•t sis, seven and eight per cent interest* This was * lower 
capitalisation per mile of track constructed than the Union 
Pacific, hut the difficulty in building the letter was far 
greater. The builders of the Kansas Pacific did go beyond: 
the pale of normal financial capitalisation, when, In July* 
1866,^  'they issued bonds mortgaging the future income of the 
new road. The definition of "ineo®#* was so worded 'that the 
bonds-‘took preference ever the toed** preferred stock; this
Psc.Rv.Comm.Raoort. Vol. 1, Testimony of Artemas H.
Holmes, p. 120......
36
Ibid.». Report of Commissioners, p. 55,
At
method was used to enable the Company to Issue', bends in ex­
cess of the amount stipulated by the Enabling? Acts* which
ceiled foe the issuance of a number equal in amount to the
37 _
federal subsidy bonds.. ' this type Of capitalisation is diffi­
cult to rationalize* even though,- in the opinion of a recent.
- authority! "The farther the line progressed the more effi­
ciently it was'constructed*,** The coat per mile went down 
- IS
as the speed of construction increased.*
The connecting link between the UnionPscific and Kan­
sas Pacific rdads was a line 106 miles in length* * running from 
Denver, Colorado.*, to Cheyenne# Wyoming. This'road*, the Den­
ver Pacific Railway.#, was, 'important for one reason, only— it ■ 
gave the Kansas Pacific an attachment to the transcontinental 
market, if the Kansas Pacific could controlit.Of all the 
Pacific, roads it'was the least expensive of the lot* being capi­
talized in its entirety at six and one-half' million dollars—  .
four million dollars capital stock and two and one-half million
dollars in mortgage bonds*
On March a, 1869* an act was signed by .President Andrew
37
'Ibid.* Testimony of Ariemes H* Holmes, pp. 121-2,
36Zoznow, pp.. clt., p, 137, '
39 '
Pee.Rv.Comm.Report. Report'of the Commissioners, p. S3.
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Johnson allowing a land grant to the Denver Pacific Rail­
way and Telegraph Company, along with permission to M i d
4#
from Denver to Cheyenne, The act further stipulated that 
the new toad was to operate 04 an adjunct of the Kansas Paci­
fic, hut not to be operated by the Kansas Pacific. There was' 
to be, as in the Kansas Pacific Denver Extension Act, no bond 
subsidy from the government and there was ait added restric­
tion that no more than $32,000 in bends could be issued' pat
41
mile of track construeted. The company had bean incorporated 
by the Colorado Territorial legislature and. was composed 
largely of cltitans of Denver, who were anxious to see Denver 
connected with the transcontinental railroad, after suffering 
the humiliation of net being included on the Union Pacific 
route. Former Territorial Governor.John Evans was instrumen­
tal in forming the company .and securing the completion of the 
Hite, by making arrangements for 'the Kansas Pacific to furnish
the rails an# tolling stock for the road after the company had
■ 42
graded 'an#, tie# the roadbed. Thus the Denver Pacific hallway 
and Telegraph Company was able to complete its line into Sen*
..—  -- -—  -nn-J* 40th Cong,, 9*4 Sosa., Vol. 40,
Appendix^ Eaws of the &nited States,* Ship. CXXVXX, p. 321
4*lbid,
*„ st««iey frit*, jBMtommt(New York:Prenfiee-Hall, Inc,,19411, p.21b. Frit* 
report*# that the Union 'Pacific provided the iron and rolling 
stock. He apparently confused the Union Pacific and th* Union 
Pacific, Eastern Division,
49
ver and start service in June, 1870, while the Kansas Pacific
• ' ea
was net completed to Denver until August. After its comple­
tion the Denver Pacific became fat All practical purposes a 
part of the Kansas Pacific*
»ith its line completed, the Kansas Pacific attempted 
to operate with two distinct disadvantages: the first was
the advantage the Union Pacific had a# to route and. connec­
tions. The latter road had the shortest route across the 
nation, east to west* The Union Pacific connections at Coun­
cil Bluffs, lows, and Ogden, litah, were el special note* The 
roads that connected with the Onion Pacific at those points 
were mutually interdependent upon the Union Pacific and vice 
versa. The Kansas Pacific had interdependent connections at 
Kansas City, but at its western end the connection with the 
Union Pacific at Cheyenne was anything but interdependent*
A^ny freight or passengers exchanged between the two roads, 
except local business, could be said to have come right out 
of the pocket of the. other. For this reason, the Union Pacific 
was not prone to devise any sort of split or sharing of this, 
business— in spite of the efipilailens of the Enabling Acta.
The other disadvantage that operated against -the success 
of the Kansas Pacific we* its risky debt structure* This prob­
lem was to almost destroy the road* The Union Pacific was
80
quick to point out that this problem of finances was respon­
sible for all #f the Kansas road's problems. The Kansas Paci­
fic in return felt that the financial condition was caused 
by the terser*a refusal to pro-rate business met from Chey­
enne— thus allowing the Kansas Pacific to share in the trans­
continental market. The. Union Pacific retort to such an 
offer was to remind the Kanaaa Pacific ’that the road between 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Ogden, Utah, was the meat expensive 
at that time, of any railroad line in; the country (which was ;
true} and that the-Union Pacific had to have all income from
44
It 'to make It. pay.■
Regardless of the causa, within two years after its
completion the- Kansas Pacific baa in trouble financially. The
Panic, of 1873 pushed the road over the precipice and if was
forced to default on interest payments. The total bonded in-
45
debtadness at the tine amounted to $28,588,000. The only* 
arrangement agreeable to the' European (Dutch and German) bend 
holders w;a:s the creation of an issue of bends covering the 
overdue interest end establishment of a receivership. This
Thompson, pa* pit,,, p. 4Sb, Thompson finds the Union 
Pacific argument "wholly sufficient.-
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Pae.ftv.Comm.Report. Vol. 2, Testimony of Artemss Holmes,
p. 133* .. ; *
**N§» 1
IfeM** p* 132 •  ,■
funding egreement forced the Denver Pacific into receivership 
alec, as the Kansas Pacific held a controlling share of the 
former's stock in# bonds.
The two receivers appointed represented 'the 'two differ­
ent classes of securities involved in the crisis, Henry Vil- 
lard acta# for the foreign bond holders and Carlos S. Greeley* 
for the Junior securities— bonds other than first an# second 
mortgage— on the Kansas Pacific Boar# of Birectors, The two 
receivers acted in this capacity from the time cf their ap­
pointment by the'Kansas court in 1870 until Just before. the 
Kansas Pacific— Union Pacific consolidation in 1880. During 
this period tbs financial condition #1# not improve to any 
degree an# the roe# remained in a ■’’chronic state of insolvency.
A study of the Kansas Pacific .reveals that its history 
was very similar to that of- the- Union Pacific. The-Aon instru­
mental in the construction of the. former were of like attitude 
to the ones associated with the- Credit Mobiliex. The' construc­
tion was fraught with as much corruption as that of the Union 
Pacific, only the story ia no* as well known. The Pennsylvan­
ia Railroad group that hi# an Influence through Thomas Scott's 
presence on the.Kansas Pacific boar# were not interested in 
the solvency of the read# only in the use to which the road
'""'m  "°"m m
ibid., Report of Commissioners, p. 55, end Ibid.. Vol. X 
Testimony of Artemaa Holmes, p. 135.
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could be put* The Panic of 1873 and the ensuing receivership 
caused the Pennsylvania group to lose interest in the road and 
to concentrate their holdings east of the Mississippi ftiver. 
Although burdened with debt and a dismal future because of 
Union Pacific competition* the Kansas Pacific was potentially 
a valuable road. It served a rich territory with a rapidly 
growing population and had adequate depots and yard facili­
ties at both Kansas City and Denver* It only needed to be 
removed from, under the stultifying weight of its poorly fin­
anced debt or have business increasesufficiently to handle 
interest payments and debt retirement*
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The years 1875-80 were packed with the manipulative 
meanderlngs of Gould and the men who opposed him. This half- 
decade saw Gould reach the top and bottom id speculative fin­
ance, have success and utter failure, and at the end of the 
period, control moat of the major railroads west of the 
Missouri River. The conflict between the Kansas Pacific and 
Union Pacific seemed almost as irreconcilable as the conflict 
eventually solved' only by the Civil War. In reality the prob­
lems between the two roads were a result of Gould’s actions 
effecting each of the lines, lie began the period (1875)1 as 
the majority stockholder in the Union Pacific, trying to force 
the Kansas Pacific Into submission. - He ended the period# as 
the majority stockholder and bondholder in the Kansas Pacific# 
forcing the Union Pacific to submit to him.
The years of 1875 and 1875 mare marked' fey only two in­
cidents of more than ordinary day to day railroad competition. 
In the spring of 1875 ©cold met with Thomas Scott# Pennsylvania 
Railroad representative on the Kansas Pacific Beard of Direc­
tors, at the Continental Hotel In Philadelphia. Purpose of 
the meeting m s  to discuss Gould’s idea for a consolidation of 
the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific. Basically the proposal
was one #f each r©ad issuing ©ne-half of the new stock to ■ 
thei* present stockholders; Scott was not interested 'an# the
i
Idea was dropped* : One season Gould did not prats far consoli­
dation was that he had already entered Into an agreement, 
lessening competition between the two roads, bsnefitting the 
Union Padlfia*
the .Kansas Pacific and the Burlington and Missouri 
(Flattamouth to Kearney, Nebraska, subsidiary line of the 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Bailroad) had sponsored a bill 
la the Congress that would force the Uhlan’ Pacific to pro­
rate any business coming onto ltd lines from other railroads. 
Gould seemingly offered the consolidation ae eh# alternative; 
the other being an agreement "to prevent competition and con­
troversies... for the mutual protection at their mutual inter*
a , ■ ■
eats.'' The agreement gave #11 local Colorado business in the 
Kansas Pacific with the Union Pacific receiving assurances 
that the Kansas Pacific would net attempt to compete fw busi­
ness coming from west of Cheyenne on the Union Pacific, they
further agreed to set rates, mutually, and to all dif-
■g ,
ferencas by arbitration.
Vae.Ry.Comm.Report. Vol.l, Teatimonyof Jay Gould, pp. 
448-502 ;
Pencil draft entitled, "Chandler’s brief of Amend.to 
K, P. Sill asking pxo-rata,*Vol. 17?» Uodoe Papers.
•man-
until-he
roads. The Burlington, the other Pool road, painted out
4
Gould’s insincerity and the Pool was reinforced,
' Therether noteworthy event; in-this connection, which 
occurred in 1876, was Gould’s philanthroptccreationof a 
funding mortgage to take case of the•Kansas .Pacific’s float­
ing debt, although he was net.« stock or security holder in 
the Kansas Pacific at this time, Gould offered the credit of 
himself and other Union Pacific hoard members to relieve the 
Kansas.Pacific directors if the first mortgage bonds defaulted*. 
Mis off Mir was accepted. The am  mortgage covered cash advances 
to the Kansas Pacific directors to pay the first mortgage bond 
Interest for 1876, to beep the receivers, Viliard and Greeley* 
from foreclosing upon the. road*. The Kansas- .Pacific- board' used 
various junior securities* including some Qenver Pacific-stock 
from their treasury* to act as collateral for the short-term 
notes maturing in February, 1877, The natural thing happened 
in February— the notes could not be act* so Gould and- .hie 
friends acquired an interest in the .Kansas- Pacific. - -
- A break in market prices* probably 'brought on by know!** 
edge that Gould bad acquired an interest in-the Kansas Pacific*
Julius IIPennsylvania 'Press','1957h
m
■»
Pae ,Rv, Comm .Report, Report of the Commissioners, p. 56.
ajjewad him to purchase even more junior securities at lew 
prices— '"same income bonds for example at twelve cents on
t .
the dollar, •* This opportunity caused Gould t# enter into a 
struggle fos?., the control of the Kansas Pacific, where him 
primary opponent was Henry Villard* the receiver whose major 
responsibility was protecting the interests of the Suiepaa® 
holders of bend#, m  the Denver Extension (100th Meridian to 
Denver). Gould himself had very little invested. He owned 
a small part ef the bonds on the floating debt* a-small part 
of the Funding Mortgage, end a substantia1 part of the junior 
securities purchased at recession prices* The other members 
of the Union Pacific board owned an equal amount (less the 
junior' .securities)*, but. Gould controlled thelr uae of the- ; 
securities. His first move was to"put.the railroad in which' 
he had: just become Interested’, into a mere'difficult finan­
cial position. ' ” ’ '
- ■ The Kaneas Paelfle* beginnlng in 18??, had aterted t© 
display a phenomenal business growth* -to off-set this Gould 
made peace withthe Iowa fuel rends and agreed to move all 
Union Paclflc buBiness through Council Bluffs. The upsurge 1 
of KansasPaeific business was the result of a number of fac- 
tors which were not iff#©h#d;by Gould’s action at '®©«aeil
Grodinsky, jg, 'Cit., p. tW-%
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Bluffs, They were* ill An increased migration ##■ people Info 
the Kansas Pacific tradeaxeaj (2j the development of the 
Texts end Mew Mexico cattle drives bringing the animals to 
the Kansas Pacific's linej ill the growth of the city a#:
Denver in population end trades And, (4) a period of leafeased 
rainfall, resulting in more farming .and larger crop production* 
; Another move by Gould to siphon ait further business 
from the Kansas Pacific was aimed at the valuable bullion 
traffic of the Coloxado mining districts. A: small and rela~ 
lively insignificant railway had been built by' a group of 
Coloradoans from longmont to Denver to handi® orb' and bullion 
fro® the mine* in ihe area * By 187T* Gould and'the Union Pact* 
fie had gained control of the Colorado Central Hailroad and 
completed it from longmont to Cheyenne, thus giving the Union
taelfin. access to- Denver. With thi*'direct competition to the, 
Denver Pacific, 'the Kansas Pacific was effectively blocked 
from the lucrative bullion traffieand the Union Pacific ac­
quired it, ' The Kansas Pacific fought back with' the only means 
at its; disposal# * further financially hurtful lowering of 
rates. This was what Gould sought# but it caused Villard to 
take separate «e tien.
8
Holmes, pp
T
Keoart.Vol. 1, Testimony of Artemas
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Villard had but one course open ta him If Gould was fa 
b# stopped. The key to any Kansas Pacific power was its con­
nection with Denver and* since Villard represented the first 
mortgage bond-holders of the Denver Extension, he instituted 
foreclosure proceedings in order toprevent Gould from com­
pletely destroying the road’s value. Gould retaliated : 
through theSt. hauls directors, having the Kansas Pacific 
Railway Company apply ta the courts, fa* the removal of Vii*' 
lard and Greeley as receivers. The application* based upon 
the .contention that Villard and Greeley hid shown partiality 
toward the bond-holders to the detriment of the company’s 
interest* waa successful. Villard denied none of the accusa­
tions hut ha made a special point of the fact that*: if. the
foreclosure "want through*, the KansasPacific would be reor-
g
ganizsd in favor of the first mortgage bondholders.
The Spring of 1878 saw Gould* his collaborating direc­
tors of' the Union Pacific, and the ft. Louis members of the ■' 
Kansas Pacific board (including Carlos Greeley) purchasing 
more'Kansas-Pacific securities-- a to e It, income bonds* Denver
Extension bonds* Funding Mortgage bonds* and even issues of
WKansas Pacific, branches. Gould, at this time* still maintained
ompany,1800, (Bostons Houghton, 
s.'282.
10
Pec.Rv.Comm.Report, Report of the Commissioners, p. 56.
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absolute control of the Union Pacific, owning two hundred 
thousand out of a total of 370,060 shares of Union Pacific 
. U C d t h  « » * . .  f.»U» - A  I M M ,  M U *  th. .«.« 1 » »  
share owners.
Villard and his interests were not. standing atlll 
either. Me hod induced the German bond-holders to increase 
their holdingsand at the same time he received help from 'the 
Burlington and Santa Fe Railroads in an attempt to control.the 
Kansas Pacific. Xt was at this point that Gould pereuaded 
Villard to enter, e securities .pooling arrangement that would 
eradicate any danger from foreclosure by the Junior securities 
controlled by. Gould and hie associates.
The. first four months of 1878 witnessed a tremendous 
spurt in naifration into Kansas with some 56,000 people coming
in by rail alone and there wet# indications that an additional 
,  12''
150.000 would follow before the end.of the year. This popu­
lation influx would have meant little .unless a solution could 
be found to the Kansas' Pacific*® financial problems. The- pool, 
arrangement offered by Gould was designed to solve that prob­
lem but at a price.
Ifald.. Vol. X, Testimony of Jay Gould, p, 451.
X2*
. letter* J. M. Eddy to. G. IS. Sedge* Hay 29* 1878, Podge 
Papers. Vol. It. ' ' '.
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Gould was of the opinion that the many different 
classes of Kansas Pacific securities "lad to such inextrica­
ble confusion" that the only answer was to put all the securi­
ties in the hands of one man and "than cut the principal'
If ,
down." Gould induced ten other Kansas Pacific securities 
holders to create a "common pool or fund holdings of securi­
ties taken it a fired valuation" with their interests In the
peel :to he proportioned to the amount of securities and stock 
, id if
contributed, 'the participant* bound' themselves tot
i
1. Secure payment of Kansas - Pacific.bonds and,
2. Set schedule of rafeset which securities might 
be entered into the''pool..'' : ' ’ ■ '
.3. apportion new stock according to holdings of 
various subscribers topool agreement. ;
.4# Provide for reorganisation of Kansas Pacific 
■m sound 'basis., '
5. Unite the two roads {Kansas Pacific and'Union 
Pacific) in order that' they could far operated as 
one road*
The last stipulation was Gould's price for putting the agrea-
' ; I S '1 ' 1 ' ; 1 'tf"!
Pac.Rv.Comm.Raport. Vol. I, Testimony of Jay Gould, 
pv 453. ' ‘ 1 " '. ' ■ -  ..
Stoart Paaaett. Railroad Reoraanlaatlon. (Boston> 1908), 
p* 226*' Besides Gould the other memfaers of the proposed 'pool 
were Frederick L. Ames, Robert S. Cerr, Sidney Billon, B. M. 
Edgerten, Garios Greeley, Arieses Holmes, B. w. Lewis,. Jr., 
Adolphus Meier,' .John B.. ferry, Jbhh P. Usher, and Henry Vil­
lard. Frederick Ames was net a Kansas Pacific security holderj 
hi* contribution was 3100,000 cash. -; See Ames Testimony before 
Pacific Railway Commission, Vol. II, pp. 646-7.
Thompson, All* SIS** f* 4if,’ _
aent through, and: one to which Villard grudgingly agreed..
At that time the funded debt of the Kansas Pacific 
amounted to $27,727,350 with rates of interest varying from
elk to ten per cent, but averaging about seven. The annual
16
interest amounted to $1,892,134.30. Under the.- gaol agreement
the securities would be reduced to a first mortgage over the
antis* roid, a government lien over part of it, and $4,800,000
17.
in capital stock. The key to the whole arrangement was de­
pendent upon the entrance of -all Kansas Pacific, securities 
holders into the pool And dome were not prone to do eg without 
the guarantee os protection of A strong lien. Hid a few se­
curities holders been allowed to remain outside the pool their
securities would have attained a value greater than, the same
18
proportion of new securities. In order to force the. laggard 
holders Gould started foreclosure proceedings under the In­
come Mortgage (junior securities) terms, thus threatening to 
take the -raid away from first mortgage bond-holders.:* Villard 
and other European bond-holders, pool participants until then, 
rebelled and began .Maneuver* of their.own to save their into-. 
rests in the road.
In June, 1878, .# new board of directoro wes elected' -
Thompson, ££« £$„$.*., P* 457.17 .... ....
Ibid,
18 '
with membership made up primarily of holders of stock and 
other junior securities* The newboard proceeded to appoint 
All' the Union Pacific officers to like- posts in the Kansas 
Pacific which resulted In overt Union Pacificoperstian of 
the Kansas road. This put the Colorado Central, the Oenver 
Pacific, and the emaha Bridge {railroad bridge from Omaha to 
Council Bluff8),beeides thetwo main lines, under Gould con­
trol. All income was to hi- pooled and apportioned out oh a - 
basis of the previous year's {1877).income.• The Union Paci­
fic. received the major share (72.85^) while the Kansas Paci- 
■ ’ It.
fid was given less thin twenty per cent* It was at this
point that Gould fait powerful enough to- oftempt foreclosure 
under the income Mortgage* -
it took, Villard until the fall of that yea* to gain 
control of a solid majority Of the QenverExtension bonds. 
Then he 'hid counsel file foreclosure proceedings» He wee > ■ 
able tp garner sufficient support from the Burlington and 
Santa. f% officials to.assure the removal of the Hthve* -ia«*
i
tension from Gould's dominance and thus emasculate the Kansas 
Pacific as a power feel*. The stroke that almost caused Gould 
to b*««fe and '«un '*»«« Vlllt*#*# announced Intention' to connect
Pae.Hy.CeffiB>.Repo*t. Vol. II, Testimony of fired#*iek, 1* 
Ames, p. 'mW» 15# HiSffws* % ’ p i -66# -fa* complete apportion­
ment break down end: method use# to arrive at the figufes fixed.
FIGURE NO, 2
908b m  I878— BETWEEN UNION jFMBXfMS# 06MMM0 0MHVM&*
DENVER PACIFIC, ANB RECEIVERS OF KANSAS PACIFIC. ,
P § f t #  * # $ m m * * # * # » •*
• # '4 « 4 4 * ■* * # * #• -4 4 ■# 4 .# &,?9«9£
4 # 4 4 * * ♦ 4 * ■* * * . * *,
.iimii ftNifl# imd Km m * * * * * • * 4
•# « 4 « # *' * 4 * ■■«> # * 4 * #• * 4 f 4 ■« ^
: % #  #$# this it#t# fit#
nf <Qm fc#itt ini fut tti#-
iiff*- fltti# *<»♦*
Wmtm WmMim mud . * # ♦ (S|i*d^*§&S
OMhi B$Ad|f# ♦ .#■ » * 4-4 4 # * % # # # .# #
Qtitimidt PmmAlfAd * % 4 4 4 ■»' $ 4 • 4 % 4 4 .% fiW®j|S60
RfMEidlMl P#-isA^ A# 4 4 * 4 4 *: * * _ 4 _ -*■ * #• * 4
4 « 4 .4 ♦ 4 4 * * * * % 4. ♦ # 4 4 4
* ^ c ,Rv.Comjn.H^port, Y#i#, II* fimtAm&iiy #f ffe#tiadUk A
* jh*. v m * ......  '
mthe eastern end of the Denver Extension to the Sent# F«, 
giving that read pit entrance into Denver, end building * new 
road connecting Convex to Ogden, Utah, This would hex* placed 
a new transcontinental road in competition with the Union
Pacific, a road parallel to it in ittr own back yard, Villard
■ '80;,' 1 :
'Had discovered a touchstone. The .pool agreement dialnte-
grated and Gould began a busy winter of marshalling his force*
to forge a complete mastery over ell the- Kansas Pacific se­
curities he could lay hie hands' on before March, 1879, the
date the foreclosure decision was to he announced by the
. . . .
court*
the only alternative open to Gould was to buy the 
Denver Extension bond#' controlled by Villard. in order to. do
r  » i  « ;
this, he -had to find a source of money, Gould, unlike most 
of the Gilded.Age financier*, was never directly associated 
with any large banks or financial corporations} haalways 
operated with Mis own money os that which he could, command 
from M s  personal associate*. The winter of 1878-79 found. 
him without ''Spy further fluid-'asset* and faced With, lowering 
Union Pacific stock market prices— his only-ready .source -of 
capital,
letter, 6* m . Dodge to 1* T. Baldwin, January 31, 1878, 
Dodoa Paper*. Vol. 19, -Dodge.«*• of the opinion that the ^ •*. j,. - aw “ «|fcm.jm ' MtMh- aft ■&*, ± m to a. m. idgreatest single threat to Union Pacific superiority was another 
coed ‘ “ tciflc at Ogden.
odinsky, m . p. 171
68
Gould capitalised 011 M s  reputation to fill his de­
pleted coffers, Early in 1879* he released an announcement 
that .a controlling interest of Union Pacific stool had been 
sold by him to a combination lad by Union Pacific and Kansas 
Pacific President Sidney Dillon and .another iotild financial 
associate* Russell Sage, Union Pacific ateel became active
and Gould began to sell at telco the price it had been a few
■ it. ; ■ . . ■ = ■ 
days earlier* 2n a short time Gould was eble to accumulate
somewhere between five- and six and ono-helf million dollars
i
in cash-easi* that was.used to carry out his plena for the 
Kansas Pacific. 
Gould want to Viiisrd “end' told Ma he [Gould] wee
tired of fighting -and ...was reedy to accept* Villard*s terms
' ■ ' 2* ’
for consolidating the Kansas Pacific mortgage* ■ Gould offered 
to pay the interest arrearage on the Denver Extension bonds* 
in full* provided the Villard group would allow the new consol- 
ideted mortgage to be funded at ate tether than seven per
cent* Villard agreed to. the-•terms: and the lien against the
Denver Extension was removed before the Federal District
Court for Kansas convened In Kerch, 1879. this put the junior
Che sale «« relieving
,28,'. ' " • :
' letter* G. M.
"Letterbook 1878-1881
to #• h. h» Clark* February 18, 1879* 
foe Papera. Vol. aed. Dodge explained 
f thevloed” m  Gould,
llllfapl Msmlm.* v°i* is* p* s®a
securities in control of th* entire road and Gould proceeded
to buy than out* so that near the middle of Kerch an '.associate
of'Gould** wrote* the *,,,u.p, has got th* K«P, without 
84'
any •if#**** .Gould paid « total of £1,310,825,48 for the re­
mainder of th* junior securities not already held by himself
1 2 5  1
Of hie associates*
the next move was designed by on* of Could'scl os a
associates, John P. Ushet*' after fefe listened to what Gould
■SS'
wanted as to commutation rates on the securities* Certain 
securities war* taken into the mortgage consolidation «t pre­
ferential rates— especially thosewhieh GouXdowned entirely* 
the new consolidated mortgage bonds wer* issued in May with 
the avowed objective of,cresting * uniform security end 
effecting a saving in interest* The market'interest in the
■ i  i *
new Kansas Pacific "consols,0 as they were called* was instan­
taneous and remarkably god#.* Th* acceptance based upon 
three things? fi) the lowering' of the total bended indebted- 
ness some £3,700,000 plus the Intelligent, monay-aaving, low­
ering of the interest rat®, which had varied from seven to- .
; 27
ten* 'to e uniform six per cent* (2) the improved management
Letter 6* II. Dodge to J. .M.Iddy, March 12, 1879* Padae 
Papers* Vol. 386, "ieiterbook, 1879-1881." , - m m m
:Voi* t» Testimony of ley Geuld*p.497
26
jbld., Vol*X2i, Testimony of -John P. Usher* p. 1698* 
^Ibld,. Vol, I* Testimony of Jay Gould, p. 496,
wand financial condition of the Kansas Pacific plus the proa-
pacts for a continuing Increase in the road*a business from
28
the movement of thousands of settlers iota itsterritory? 
and (3) the anticipation of collecting the interact arrearage 
from the pre-mortgage consolidation Denver intension bonds* 
Demand for the "consols* was so greet that they jumped to a 
potation ef.46 over per shortly after they were issued,
* / t.
Having dealt with Villard* Gould's attention was turned 
to one of the railroads that, -had joined with Villard in tty-
i f
ing to keep Gould out of Kansas Pacific control, the. Burling­
ton had been looking tm a -way to compete with Gould at O&nver* 
The St. Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company possessed a 
charter allowing it to - build to Denver across northern Kansas, 
By 1879' it had. laid only i few; miles of track extending out 
onto the Kansas Prairie from th# Missouri Rive* and was con­
nected with ft*; Joseph by a1 railroad bridge owned by the St, 
Joseph Bridge Company. .Burlington official# began cautious 
inquiries about the ownership end the possibility' Of extend­
ing th# road to Gamer*. Upon hearing that news*. Gould fall 
on the virtually worthless road 'and bridge* and in June. 1879. 
purchased all the stock of the former and bonds of th# latter.
Thompson, go. CM*. p. 468,
' SUlflgg j&SB&Eg.* Voi.II, p. 283.
n
This was 8 foolish move in i way* for It showed speculators 
that Gould might be frightened into buying property of ques­
tionable value*
: That year turned out to be a busy time for Gould. It 
began with the St. Joseph episode and; was followed in August 
by an ocean trip to Amsterdam. The purpose of th# trip was 
to purchase from Dutch holders, be# and one-half million 
dollars in benvet failfid bonds. He arrived m  hia personal 
yacht in Amsterdam one morning, had-' breakfast, asked the 
bond-holders to » luncheon matting, purchased their bonds 
at T4, and started hit return to the United States that after­
noon. Purchase of the Denver Pacific bonds made him'majority 
bond-holder end in s position to control any foreclosure of
that road,, a possibility suggested by th#' Dutch holders when
! • * ' INI
they- bed not been included in the consolidated mortgage* 
With the majority of- Denver Pacific stock held in the 
Kansas Pacific treasury, virtual control could now be exer­
cised over the Denver area* The only value of the Denver
Pacific or its stock was the measure of worth a consolidating 
' D!
company might place upon it. 'The. road did.serve as the only
connecting link between Denver and Cheyenne for a time* but
3:Jjjap, By.Coma.RaDort. Vol. I, Testimony of Jay Gould,
p. 4:6§* ' . '    '
tfpJL
J M d ., P. 491. '
mthe completion of t parallel track by the Union Pacific-owned 
Colorado Central greatly impaired its value. At this junc­
ture the Denver Pacific stood only as a pawn ia A bigger 
game— to be weed by Gould to five him the Moat benefit*'
The only abateele to compieteecntrol of the Denver 
area was 'the Atchison* Topaka and Santa H  lease of the Den­
ver and Rio Grande Railroad*a line into that City* In retail* 
ation fat th* Santa F**s assistance to VillaM# Gould moved 
to block 1* out of t*> September he mm ible to pur­
chase half of the Denver and Rio Grand#** voting trust certi­
ficate* at twenty-two cents m  the dollar in a contract -that
called, for payment In cash* Kansas Pacific stock at 66, or
32
Kansas Pacific ^ console*' at ©t* With controlling Interest of
« -f
the Denver and iio Grand# tucked into Ml portfolio* Gould
\ •- f *
broke the Santa Fe lease of hi* mm retd** tracks Into Denver 
and th* ©tty was hi*. Alt four of major roads coming 
into th# town were controlled effectively by him, or hit 
associates, In the case of the Colorado Central.
Gould was now ready to repeat his overtures for a con­
solidation. This time he controlled the Kansas Pacific and 
made the offer to the Union Pacific. The exact terms offered 
by Gould were never, revealed, although It wa* known ’'that he
Grodinaky, pg. s£S** p.-174.
valued Kansas Pacific, compared with Union Pacific, very much 
higher ...than th* *eet of the [Union Pacific] dtreetore did.,. 
The Union Pacific management, even those closely associated 
with Gould in the Kansas Pacific, agreed •perfectly" with M e  
m  hie desist he eliminate competition, between theaeeivea end 
other xoede, but feelings were split on the relative value of
m  '
the two seeds* The seal opponents wexe the directors. fmm
m
Boston* led by P. Gordon Qexter. Another way of looking ti­
the offer wea to aasum* that Gould tod- net yet pit'the Union 
Pacific directors in a poeition where they had' to agree to 
consolidation, They could still intex-change freight at 
Council Bluffs and ©gden* Their short route m s  still the 
heat and in high demand. \
As the pressure of Gould*a consolidation echoes began 
to build* he became more susceptible to the maneuvering© of 
railroad speculators mo owned railrosds near the Kansas Pa­
cific, ’ One sum was ©liver Ames, nephew of the ©liver Awes 
of Union Pacific fame. Be .had* upon the death of .hie name­
sake, inherited a few hundred share* #f Central Branch Union 
Pacific {originally the Atchison end Pikea Peak Railroad)
33 Psc.Ry.CaKim.Reoort. Vol.ll, Testimony of F, Gordon 
Beater, p, W 2 . ...
Thompson, aa. pp, 458-9,
35 Murat BojateadV felfa of lav Gould. (fn.pHs Idgewood 
Publishing Co., 1892), pp. 184-5. 1 J
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stock in 1877* By 1879 he had added to th# Inheritance to
36
the extent of controlling theCentrsl Branch road. This was . 
the road that 'had taken over the rights of the Hannibal end 
St. Joseph Railroad Company to build e line under the tern* 
of the 1862 Act* no longer than 188 miles in length, joining 
the Leavenworth* Pawnee end Western as that road 'built toward 
the 100th Meridian to connect with the Union Pacific in Neb­
raska. ■ M  the Kansas Pacific (successor to the teavenworth 
road) did net. make the connection with the Union faciiie* the 
Central Branch line ran a hundred miles out onto the Kansas J. 
prairie wait of Atchison and stopped,
‘-After witnessing Gould*#- treatment of the ft* Joseph 
and ©enver City, when threatened with e proposed connection 
to fanver by an Eastern road* Amea approached Commodore C. K. 
farrlsOn* President of the Missouri Pacific, and suggested 
that the ban of them build the Central Branch to Qenver and 
operate the -'Missouri Pacific over it* ■ To prove his- faith*
Ames started building s- 288 Mile extension onto the one hun­
dred',length of the Central Branch at M s  mm expense.-, this 
antagonised Gould and he started preparations to build- brenchss 
of the Kansas Pacific into Central Branch territory* Ames 
retaliated by' repeating M s  Garrison offer to the, Burling,ton
and Rock island roads and: Gould succumbed,* Gould met with
Ames* supposedly at the behest of the Boston directors of the.
37
Union fttfclfte* Ames asked far end' **e»lv*<i in-Gcishar* 1679, 
an sv*»a#d «f ®23S per share or $1*826,300 for 7*616 shares 
which consisted of five-eighths of the total stock of them
read*
The financial condition of this roed was faxfrom 
food*. The Central Branch had not paid a dividend in six 
yearns its bonds had been in default for some tifle j and* as 
iaie as 1878*. the stock had been selling for §* little as 
ton cents on the dollar. An objective examination years after 
«**# found no ",. .conceivable justification for iheprice paidm '
by Mb* Gould to Olivet Ames fat the stack,,,,"
In latex years Gould refused to- admit he had been 
best*d~-fooiad* yes* but not defeated* *i saw a freight 
train *nesfn®1 out of every station*, and sometimes we had to 
wait to get by** he said* in reporting on the trip, over the 
Central Branch before,ha- purchased it. He was to learn only 
Sftit purchasing the .res# that th* management had "saved up*
Ife&Sl.* pp. 803-6.
; Thompson, Iffi, Mi.* p* 063,
39 ,
. Pac■Rv.Comm.Ranort. Report of the Commission, pp.100,60 
' Ibid.. Vol.I, Testimony at .Jay Gould, p,.§2S«.
• > * • j i
■m
freight over « eeveo to ten day period in order ip- impress 
him with the large amount of business the road wss doing,
Ames reported that Gould did .net make an inspection trip un*. 
til after the purchase of the roed end that freight had been
saved only one day to make Gould "feel food* about his pm*
4#:- ’ . ' • , ■.
, > « if ^  '!
whether the road was a goad or bad buy was inconsequent
................................  ! •  . I . ' - : .
tlaito Gould. 'He found a way to make the road pay its first
* \ L> ‘ ■ ; ■ 4SI ,
.dividend In six yearst he leased it to the Kansas Pacific.
In that mf any losaes In operetion were borne by that rood'
rather .than, the owner of the Central Baanch.
By 0ctober 23, 1879, Gould and Russell Sage were able
to move the "Boston dieettaif*** P* ffesfleMt., ft#**#** Elisha
 ^ •» «
Atkins, Frederick L. Aetea, and 1* H» Bakes, to send a letter
' i • !• *
askingfor the investigation of the feasibility of a consoli­
dation :of;the’Union pacific> and Kansas Pacific. Grenville~ 
Dodge and Solon Humphreys, both closely assoclated with Gould, 
were the aen selected io investigate the "equitable condi­
tions "upon which a consolidation would "promote the interests
v:t.-T,,7 ni]i^xl)iil:Mr:nfi :n:
. Ibid., Vol. XX* Testimony of Oliver Ames, p. 811.'
4f .............
-.Vol*..!* T**%i«i»ny of Xiy Gould*' p* $37#
of each” railroad. “as well ;«s those at Hi# «,*■.«#-
Gould later said that Dodge was "one af th© bast engineers and
the beet railroad man" thit-®ent*ai tssMit hid *§»«*
Humphreys "had lived in feint Louis and was conversant with 
' '44
hath' af theae properties," Gould’s feeling was that they
wear© "two disinterested men* whose sola responsibility was to
inform the directors what would constitute * "fair consoll-
4S ■
ditiefc-,*
In 1879, Dodge was In Gould’s employ end'had been 
since at least 1873. Dodge seemed to be Gould’s engineering 
advisor with the responsibility of handling branch and exten­
sion construction in addition tofinencial and directorship
‘ 46
arrangements, While Dodge had not been a "great believer" in,
7- f i f
the' proposed consolidation earlier*it would have been diffi- 
, ■ . . . .  ' : 47 '
cult for him to have opposed It at that tine*. Hodge’s bio­
grapher seid that "Gould'came to depend upon him bodge in
. letter, G*M,0odge and .felon Humphreys to Union .Pacific . 
Director*, January 16, ISftO.l’I.atterbook, 1878-1881.“ Oodoe 
Pe.oers, 'Vol., iff, The. original esctobor 23rd letter seems to 
hive been lost. ' Hie letter cited here acknowledges that letter 
and quotes it, in its entirety,
Voi* I, testimony of Jay Geuld*p.d?7*4>w».w»sww-™pTrac, . # ., ... .
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letters G.M. Dodge i» frank. S.Bond, Vie# President of the 
Tires Pacific ftailroad andGecrga Wolcott, Chief Engineer of , 
the Union Pacific Railroad* dated April 7, 1879,and December 22, 
1879, respectively,#ietterbook,1878-1881*s Oodoe Paoera.Vdl.38fe,
r '
J&i&* better, to S.H.H.Clarfc from G.M.Dodge,February 1,
All. things save the financing of the roads, although Dodge 
formulated many of the capitalists plans for consolidation
and extension,”
‘ Humphreys, the other "disinterested* party to the in­
vestigation, was a similar personality. He wasdencrihad by
"operating chiefs" he wet president of the recently Gould- 
consolidated Wabeah, St.iouis and Pacific Railway Company 
when assigned to look Into the proposed Union Pacific - Kan­
sas Pacific merger*
the examination that bodge .end Humphreys were to make 
consisted of looking "...into the accounts of the rood and 
. .. [fami liar iring] themselves with -the character of -the 
country, .end the connections end the amount of business that
wee likely to be built up on the rood in the future." " if 
ouch « comprehensive study could have been done by badge in
48
another railroad official of the day as one who "...reflected
.4f ■ :
the idem of Gould*" Acting, ilk ' 1879, as one of Gould*s
48Perkins, jaa, &X&,, xii.
49cited in Grpdinsfcy, o&.clt.. f , '-.240* 
50lfel£.*P* 24 and Talbott, ijfi, cit.. p. 118*
Awe#*
f*Ey.£saB*MRIOl* Vol.Ii.Testimony ofFrederick L.
two weeks. It was faithfully done* because between Gctobe#,
13791 and January, 1880, date of the coneolidatiofl^Bedfe was 
absent from Hew York fo* only that length of time.
while Bodge ond Humphreys may not hove left New York 
during that period, Gould did, .fit fatly November he made a 
trip to Missouri to see Co»aodore C. 16# Garrison, owner of 
the Missouri Pacific, to discuss their mutual problems, iifoen 
Gould bad blocked Garrison* a move ta gein control of the Cen* 
tral Branch iu Gctober, the Commodore had purchased control 
of a: narrow gauge road, M b  Miff in length, extending weai 
fxm Leavenworth, Kansas, between the Kansas Pacific and 
Central Branch roads, On November 13, Gould bought Gsrrison*s 
Missouri Pacific, 300 Miff in length, Iron St, bout* to Kan*.
- '  I
sas City, for three million dollars, and the Garrison Inter- 
eat in the narrow gauge Kansas Central Railroad for $479,GOO, 
The price paid for the Kansas Central was, as in the case of 
the Central Branch, blackball, but the Missouri Pacific was
$Pr
e good: buy# oven ft M o  $750 per share.
Gould was 'if control of a rail network that hod connac-
"Sflt-' 'An axemination Of the Oadae Papers. Lettesbeoks.Oiariee# 
and correspondence fails to ravaal thatBodg e was away from 
New York except -fat a short period around the and:, of. November 
and early December, He did not return to Council Bluffs for 
Christmas Mat' year, which nib unusiial,
.' ' ' . bdf' tt* CaiMBidaliMt* »*_
Robert !$§**> Riegel, *‘The 1879-1900,0
Missouri Review. Vol. 18 (1924), p. 25.
mtions'm pm east aa Buffalo, HewYork, and #». far watt (ex­
cluding tha UMon Pacific) aa Denver and Cheyenne, He had 
only to complete links to Saw York la the east and' to Salt 
lake city m  Ggden .la; the nest and' he would' have! had « rail­
road of truly transcontinental proportions, capable of' des­
troying the refflolnlnf walue of the Union Pacific, . .
In order that he would not be left holding any virtu­
ally worthless stock Gould turned ever his controlling in­
terests in the .Kansas Central, St, Joseph and Denver City',:
. end St, Joseph Bridge Company to -the Kansas Pacific Treasury 
making them branches or aubeidihfie# of the Kansas Pacific,
At-the same time Gould was able 'to remove 29,979 aharea of 
Denver Pacific stock from trusteeship by likewise depositing ■
$1,500,000 in Denver Padflc;;funding bonds he 'hid purchased 
bb _ \ *
in Amsterdam, - The Denver Pacific stock was then paid to
.Gould in return im the above subsidiary stocks he hid Just
placed in the Kansas Pacific Treasury. Gould’s base was now ■
very flrmj he could afford to wait 'for- the Union Pacific
people to come to him, under M e  conditions.
Gould changed hi# tactics,- from th#t af pressing, . to
m waiting game. He began talking in grandelse terms of build-''
ing an extension of the Kansas Pacific from Denver to Galt'
, „ W l w „ - l>ln y l. » ll. l, w ^ , l |W l , , , > H , .  \ - r - *  ' i -
ww *
Bepor t of Commission, p, 55*
M s *  m Ogden M i  mm tod mmmm started paralleling the
36
Central Pacific to &m Pjpencisco. When the tooeton group* of 
Union Pacific directoars approached him In left Beeeator of 
1879 assenting to hie September offer to merge, he refused 
to do so, no ting tout hie *lnttoset« hM',eto«to6»*' to re­
ported ttot to- even offered toe directors one million dollars# 
cash, if.they would let hi® out of toe merger,
the half-d«c»de between 1875 and 1680 mm- Gould mo# 
rifiee victories in seversi bottles in order to pvt himself 
into position to win the consolidation wit* Villard showed 
himself to to inflexible when the interests of hi* bend-hold* 
ars were involved and aide Gould do right by them, 'the 
“Master Manipulator* was forced to take ever several worth­
less proper tie# in order to pit toe Union Pacific into e 
cornel and an ito knees. By Geeamber* 1879, he occupied a 
very strong position end to was ready to make toe m$% of it.
■ Fulton, Eelc (Sen Franciscoi a , »,
Robertson, 19247T pp. ^-30.
57r’ .
sg J&M-# V«4* 1# Testimony of Jay Gould, p. 47?* 
Ibid.. p, 485,
Wftit CQNSC&XOAfiOi MB' ttt NSW ROAD
By January, 1880, Gould was ready to move. Me had to# 
potential to drive too Union Pacific out of too Transconti­
nental market. By Joining too financial destinies of to# 
Boston group of directors to Ms, he insured tool# eventual
t 1 t-
f ; - .
consent to merge at M.# terms, Th# Boston group tod* in lot#
■ : ' -i 1 * -
December, lift*, relieved Gould of some of to# extra (beyond 
controlling interest) stocks and bonds of hia recent aegul* 
sitions. Gould, along with Russell Sage and Sidney Billon, 
was in santtel Of #11 of the toiild Middle-iHastern holdings*
By January of 1813* toe Union Pacific directors, Frederick 1, 
Amea* F, Gordon Baxter, Elisha Atkins, end E, H* Bitot had 
to####, involve# with 'to# Kansas Pacific, 'Kansas Central, St. 
Joseph and Denver City, and the Central Branch UMon Pacific, 
although their main interest ml# still to# Union Pacific.
'Could tod 'aold them the totorlti#* at toe cost which
was way below pax. In this way the Boston group stood to
' ! ,* * * * 5
profit, proportionately to# same as Gould from toe proposed
f , ' ! '1 ?
consolidation. Whether guided by better Judgement or fear
' ' ' • ) I
of what they knew 'Gould would to* tot Btot## directors con­
tinued to hold back to# to# beat terras they could get for 
to# Union Pacific.
.;i#e,Rw,G#to..Raoegt,' Beoort of the Commission, pp.58-9.
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The price .of K a m m  Pacific stock had been climbing .
higher each month since February of 1879. After selling as
low as 9 1/8 in January,.it made a forty point Jump In April■
to a ^dotation of 89*- Th* offar by Gould to' consolidate in
September had caused an additional eighteen point upward'
. 2
surge. The market growth continued into th* new- year. By 
January, 1880, there was talk from Boston of a soon-to*
be-developed cause for a further advance" in Kansas Pacific
' § ■
stock. On January 6, Kan*#* Pacific stock passed Union
Pacific in price on=th* New York Stock Exchange; Kansas
. . 4
Pacific closed at 86 and Union Pacific at 84 T/S.
Gould soon became greatly "irritated with the Union 
Pacific people for standing out ...from consolidation at ’hie 
terms." Hi* threat te build a Denver-Salt take City or Og­
den line still hung like a storm-laden cloud over the pro-. 
ceedings. It was this threat that caused the Boston directors 
„  ».i „»h *,„» W « W dl, «.
January with little apparent success.
0b
New York Times; January 1 - December 31, 1879.
,lsm lialfl M&Utex. p*a Moines], - January i, 1880;
# ;
Ibid..January 7, 1880 and New York Times;January 6,1880.
5 , - j
pee.Rv.Comm,Report. Vol.il; Testimony of Frederick L. 
Ames,6g, 6il* ,
This is based upon supposition. Nowhere in.’the available 
sources Is there a statement of the demands which’Gould made be­
tween September,l879, and January; 1886; A reasonable assumption 
ii that as-hi.fi: pefiitian grew-fitrei®#* so did the value wbifk -he
f laced upon the Kansas Pacific. This is not, however, reflected n the meager agreement.
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On January 14, 1880, a meeting was held In the drew**'
.1nfi room ef Gould*® New York town house, Present, in addition 
ta Gould, were Sage, Dillon, Ames, Baker* Dexter^ and .in ail
probability Solon Humphreys and Grenville Dodge* Elisha
8
Atkins was absent, but cognisant of the meeting. Consolida­
tion was not discussed; it was # foregone conclusion with 
everyone resigned to it* the question under study was what 
the terms ef consolidation would be,
’■ Gould presented hie arguments for fixing the value, of
the Kansas Pacific stock on e par (or better) with: the Union
'
Pacific! (1) the Kansaa Pacific, extended fifty miles fur­
ther east than Union Pacific, giving it fifty more miles of 
rich agricultural land from which to draw business; (a), the 
Kansas Pacific was 2,000 feet closer to sea level, on the 
average, then the Union Pacific, thus providing better agri­
cultural territory end lees trouble from winter snow storms;
(3) the Kansas Pacific bed terminals at Kansas City end Den­
ver valued: at $2 ,00 0 , 0 0 0 .and $1 ,00 0 , 0 0 0 respectively; .and.
’ ; ■ 9(4 ) the Kansas Pacific branches were extremely valuable.
mmmm T
Pac.Rv.Coffue.Raport, Vol.12, Testimony ef Frederick 1, 
Amec, p. 6687
Ibid.. VeJfc:,!*, Testimony ef Elisha Atkins, 757-8,
9" / •" ■ ' ■ • * ■ ;
Vel.* 2, Testimony of Jay Gould* pp. 585-4.
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Th«s» were all good arguments and built « case difficult to
' F* Gordon Dexter, some years l*t«r, claimed to hove
* ' ■ ' : 
ptm*mtod tli* infotmation that caused Gould to enter the
mexaar #0- the t«ros the Boaton arouo fm# Between ttiii
October and January meetings It# had found out that the Bur*
lington Railroad intended to *t*»t‘ f.'buiigli*jt progxa® in
Nebraska and on west at least to Benver. ' Such a plan would
shatter the strength of both roads if they remained indepen**
dent*
A memorandum of agreement was drawn up oa follows s
Kansas Pacific Railway Company, 
i ' Mew'Vo»k# Jan*Y 14, 1880, 
MSMOs of terms of agreement for consolidation of Union
Pacific with Kansas feeifie in' which the Denver Pacific, 
Saint Joe ft Western, & Union Pacific, Eastern Division, 
ore Included*
- All necessary papers, end any further agreements-to be ’ 
prepared by Judge Billon on his return, the Union &
Kansas Pacific, with all theie respective.assets ini1 
properties and liabilities, axe to be put together at 
par* ef their respective capitals - $36*762,300 R 
*10,000,000, to which is to be idled: the capital of 
the Sever--Pacific, $4,000,000 making the capital of 
the Union Pacific Railway'Go** as the -we#' line shall 
be called, *51,762,300. ;■
■the Denver faeifid iipltii,* now «**.iaa#t of the
’ Ibid.. Vel, II*. Testimony of #* Gordon Dexter, pp,7G4-6.
11 . ■ 1,
jPaid., Vol. II, Testimony of Frederick 1. Ames, p.668. 
Met#' that an error in addition wac made? the total *51,762,300 
should have been $50,762,300. This was subsequently discovered 
add corrected* ' ’ '
06
to 60 used after conversion into .Railway stock to 
pay for share# «nd bonds of St,Joe & Western ft.ft.tst.
566 Bridge# an hereafter stated, & for other purposes.
The St,Joe & Western R,R, lot mart,[9*80] Bonds and 
stocks to the extent of » controlling Interest in the 
same to be: bought of parties now owning it, at par, 
for bonds & $20 ■a share for stock - payment to be made 
in U,P,Railway stock, ■' '
The road to be i«t*ed;te the ®»p*Sailwfty #e# -for 
the. interest on 1st »o*t, bonds, or otherwise as nay 
be determined* The Bridge if St.#.. Jneephls le be 
bought of.parties now owning controlling interests 
in the bonds & shares of the sane, at par, .for bonds 
with .the shares thrown in# & payment to be node either 
In •haeee of U. P. Railway, ■ at p**# or K*fyS®n# [solid#ted] 
mart. bonds# at par#. ,
the Onion Pacific, Sastern Giwtslen,[raeaning Central 
Branch Union Pacific] is to be taken at cost ta Hr, 
Could, 6 paid for in same securities that he gave, 
via# about one-half in K*P,Con,mort,bonds, & one-h#lf 
in new U«P. 6 per. cent, Trust bands* both at par# -
%i[iM|Se|0 B» [age]
fredk, t, Ames
S jfcf ■ '*. *»#■ PM##f*. 6. Baxter,
fldnay Billon ,
'.tm days §fter the tentative consolidation agreement 
Mid been drawn.* Grenville Bodge and Solon Humphreys addressed 
thair answer to the October 2 3 request for *f*ir and equitable
• I  - i I ;
terms* for such a consolidation* When asked later whereBodge 
and: Humphreys had been during this period, Gould indicated he
;■ 1 1 i' . 1 , * r
"did not knowi * that he might have ’‘seen* them .but did not: .■ ■. "Is-
talk' of the consolidation. The Boston director# were oppar-
H&ftf* Testimony af Jay Qould, Vol. 1, #►*. 477,
ently more interested in the survey because Frederick 1,,'48>#»
is
admitted talking to both men about it.
the report was purportedly to be "as an extensive an 
I***,,- .. «-» «h. ,«i«* *.U«, »d. (jhidh
ran to nine volumes and took over a year to complete). the
Dodge-Humphrays survey report was two hand-written pages in
4
length and "by asingular coincidence* was "a mere zeproduc-
tiott/of the terms contained in the agreement of January 14,
IS
1880, executed.at Mr. Gould’s house.* the important part of 
the. report was to be found in the summary and' concluding sug­
gestions that the two roads should consolidate-on a share
16
for share basis into the Union Pacific-Railway Company*. .Aft4
bodge and Humphreys saw the two roads they were equal in - 
everything, physical condition, earning' capacity, and indebt­
edness. The only dissimilarity was.their, difference in .
1? • 
length. With -the reception of this report Sould,had •ob­
jective"' approval for his consolidation terms.
Public reaction -was not long in coming- when word of 
the consolidation began to circulate, Humors of the impend-
., Testimony of F. L. Ames*. Voi, 11, p. 638.
, ibid.. p. 637.
AS
P*l23l Hl^toe^l8Wle6^!ll»iu^^lS|lBSe|erlf* Apl>*n^*'
letter- G. M. bodge and Solon Humphreys to Union Pacific - 
Directors, January 16, 1686, Podtta Paaere.Vol.3 8 6 ."Letterbook - 
1878-1881," p. 253.
17ikM*. PP* 253-4.
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ing conolldaiion had been rampant from the tine Gould began 
actively manipulating the fete of the.'boo roads* Each new 
rumor had caused renewed activity on the hew York Stock -tx*
Cheng#;, with regard to Kansas Pacific stock end the price
advanced each tine* Reporters often sought out prominent m
members of 'the Union Pacific hoard fee verification or re*
pudiation of the yarious rumors. It wee for lust such a
reason that a Staff member of the hew York Times wrote of
trying to confirm a rumor reporting that the directors of
the Union Pacific had been "in session in the offices of
that company** for a week* supposedly discussing a merger with
18 19
the Kansas Pacific* He reported that*
Hr. Russell [ Russell Sage?] in particular asserted that 
the story was made out of the whole cloth,.,. He added,, 
that negotiations of the sort indicated were not only 
not in progress, but had never been'.in contemplation, 
though in his private Judgement - the idea was a good one* 
and he had no doubt that such ft consolidation would be 
effected in the remote future**
But, the report continued:* sine# 'Kansas Pacific stock was
still booming*
There were ,,.indications that the parties most in- . 
terested had been playing havoc with the'truth* end 
several responsible gentlemen, who generally manage
Hew York Tlmaa, January 19* 1880*
Ibid*
to keep themselves infowned os to. financial matters, 
told the TIMES reporter that they knew this to be the 
case,”
There ^ had been a report on the flight of January If 
that a merges had been effeeted— it was this report the' re­
porter free.the New fork Times was trying to confirm, along 
with a dispatch from Boston. Members of the Beaten Group 
of director* had returnee! to that city saying the “merger 
had been effected with only the drawing up of the detail* - 
causing the delay,* Apparently the Boston director* were 
not a* close-mouthed about the merger because of their un­
happiness with th* way it had been foisted upon them* “Jay 
Gould bed finally induced the Union Pacific to take the pill
after sugar-coating it," one of their number wee reported to 
22
have said. The Boston Directors were able to see that the
merger gave the Union Pacific a great advantage “in connec-
23
tien with Gould’s south-western system of roads,"
Whan confirmation came, the New York llama, attacked 
the consolidation doubly— once on the front page in a news 
item and again,’ editorially. The front page story repeated 
the earlier statement of the “Boston Director" and ascribed 
confirmation to • "New York resident Director, who ...was
90
24
also to officer of the Union Pacific Company.* The report 
wee accurate in *11 respects, save on#, 'The article refer*
red to ten continuous days of negotiation that ended on
25 _.
January 16, 1880. The use of this date was an attempt to 
support., the £>odge»Humphr«ys letter (same date) - as being the 
crucial lever in the consolidation negotiation,' when their 
letter obviously was drawn up to support the tentative eon*, 
solidstion agreement of January 14.
'The article surmised, rather caustically, that the 
result* of the consolidation would h#i (1) The Union Pacific 
would have two outlets-* Omaha end Kansas City— rather than 
lust ona. (2) Since the Union Pacific was required to pro­
rate all freight from Omaha— it seemed a certainty that■
Gould would move most of the Union Pacific business to the 
East through Kansas City (where no pro-rate law applied) and 
onto his own Wabash system, (3) The final result would he 
“the eventual complete monopoly of transcontinental business 
by J»y Gould.“
Editorially the paper was even, more pointed' in its 
criticism of the agreement. The tech taken was that the
"" !l,'rir,,,^ 4 :v nn:xr";:"'1 T:;::
ibid.. January 20, I860,
25
Ibid,
26
Ibid,
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*• :r- >
large corporations of the nation . (railroads particularly)
mate combining inti conaolldating to a point that monopolies
mete resulting and the rhetorical question was asked? Is
th# public beginning to regard consolidation and combination
synonymously with monopoly?
Going on to point out that the latest consolidation,
* ■ *' ’ 
of the Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific, raised .the Question
once more. Protection of the "vested and speculative" inter*
eats was insured by the terms of the agreement, but where,
the editorial ashed,'ware the Interests of the public pro*
tected? 4 further observation was that, the "West will feel
most deeply the malign effects of''the ‘Gould System,* hut ■
the traffic of a continent will also suffer," As if fpreset*
inf impending doom for recalcitrant corporations the editor*
ial concluded that, the "companies cannot complain if the
way finally chosen [ for solution] by Congress be not. alto*
3(0
gether in consonance with their wishes."
the investing public reacted also on, January 20, the 
day the consolidation was confirmed? Union Pacific fell off 
one and one-eighth points te 9S& and Kansas Pacific declined1
92
four points to 103* One source attributed the declined to 
the realisetion that the new teed would declare m  stock
m
dividend. The decline continued for the nett several day*.
During the ten day period from January 14 to 24, t . 
number of significant events transpired In connection with 
the consolidation. An important one already .mentioned awe, 
the Dodge-Humphrays raport-letter of January 16* the news- 
leak of the twentieth was another and* although editorial 
comment was vitriolic, neither the government no* the govern­
ment directors of the Union Pacific .made any move to stop or 
oppose in any way the proposed consolidation*
It was during' this period that John P. Dillon, Gould * s
•hie attorney* was drawing up and ironing out the final con-
30
solidation agreement. It would seem that 'the news leak on
I
January 86 was probably an attempt it "running it up -the 
flag pule* to see- if anyone would salute"— as a gauge of 
public end governmental opinion— .if such things were con­
sidered during the "Gilded Age** .
The flnpl move made during-this preparatory period 
was the resignation of Jay Gould fro* the boards of both the
Ibid.,. January 21-31, 1833*
30
_  Si£*&*Sai«iaiaSi* Vol. I, Testimony of Jay Gould, 
pp* 483-5.
©a
Union Pacific and Kansas Pacific Railroads. He did ibis 
apparently upon the advice of Dillon because of how it would
look with Gould representing both parties to the consolida-
31
tion. Gould’s resignation, dated January 12, 1333, effective 
January'1©, lie©,, woe not announced until the'early after*
" m
noon of January Ml later that awe afternoon Gould was
elected to serve on the board of the new road--the Union
33 ■
Pacific'Railway Company.
According to the testimony of one of the Boston ©ire®* 
tors, Frederick L. Ames* Gould did not submit his resigna­
tion print to the night of the fourteenth when the tentative
34
agreement to consolidation wee made*- This action on. the
pert of Gould was later characterised as a "confession of -'
35
conscious guilt,0' the reason he resigned was because he was 
going to sell his various branch lines to the old roads** 
Union'Pacific* Kansas Pacific, and Denver Pacific— and be 
peid in stock of the new road* While M s  none did hot appear 
on the Union Pacific stockholder list between January 1 end' 
20, 1830, Gould still owned 27,000 shares of that toad*a
^^nuM«Ma»^uanr»isie».uKr.’
Ibid.,Vol.11,Testimony e# Frederick i. Ames, pp.666*7.
3dl»
'Ibid.,- Wei, 1, Testimony of Jay Gould* p. 516*
33
Ibid.
34,
iblrd,. Vol.II, Testimony of Frederick L. .tees, p.667. 
35...
Ibid.. Report of Commission, p. 62,
stock Along with 73,342 shares of various issues of Menses 
36
Pacific stock. Retention of his. position on the boards of
either road would have side him hath e buyer end s seller*
m  open conflict of interest. Gould say have resigned either
upon advice of counsel or it the behest of the boards of the
consolidating roods. Which one is not important because the
neve was not made until the agreement had been forged} his
selection, to the board of the new reed.was assured.
the consolidation agreement of January 24 was in
.reality a "carbon copy® if the memo drawn in Gould’s home ,
Just ten. days before* with the exception that fl© mention
w»« made of the various, "cheap-piece" branches unloaded by. ' 
37 ,
Gould, The new board of directors consisted of the men who
had had chairs on the boards of the. two old.-.roads plus Solon
38 ,
Humphreys and Grenville Bodge, Since the agreement required
that a director ."must be the bona fide owner of at least
fifty shares of stock it* the consolidated company,K it may
38
be assumed they, met the "legal’* requirements.
The new, toed was 1*820 miles In length. Mth' the Union
I ,  ,:m i , ' U N ' T ^ T . r x . n ,
Ibid.. Vol.1, Testimony of lay Gould, pp,518,474 and 
37See_AppendiK, p,126, for entire .text of Articles ,af
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fselfIs asking tip well over on®-half of that total (sea 
Figure 3). Th® cities of Gmaha, '{Kansas City, Denver, and 
Ogden were the wain terminals and points whose business 
could be expected to naturally be the heaviest (see sap,
P* 93:1*
FIGURE 3.
- Union pacific Railroad * * * * * * . * * 1*042 miles
Kansas Pacific Railway * . . . . * . . . 339 miles
• Leavenworth Branch of Kansas Pacific * . 34 Mies
Denver Pacific Railway . . * *..*.* * * * 106 miles
total length 1*321 Mies
the combined bended.debt of the two roads equalled • 
*124 ,215 ,909 .60  (see Figure 4 * p* 9?) which averaged '. 
*6 8 ,2 1 3 .0 2  per mile. The debt of the Union Pacific was made 
up of first mortgage bonds (Government lien), sinking fund 
bonds* land-grsnt bonds* coileterel-trust bonds* end Omaha 
Bridge.bonds* The debt of the Kansas Pacific— Leavenworth 
Branch--Denver Pacific consisted of first mortgage bonds 
(Government lien).on the first 394 miles of the Kansas Paci- 
fie, Leavenworth Branch bonds* two issues of land-grant bonds* 
Denver extension bonds* intone bonds*, funding bands, end; over-
Dbd'ae -Papers. Vol. 170, While not dated this w«s 
apparently apart of the working papers Dodge and Humphreys 
used writing their letter of January 16, 18B0.
£S£*6x«Si2aS»SasaLl« Vol. I* Testimony of Jay Gould,
m m
mI Ii i:
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due interest bonds. The average debt pee mil# m  the Onion
' . „ ' • / ’ * » ' = *. '
Pacific m s  lowered somewhat, but, of enures, the average 
oe. the Kansas Paclfic was raised, the pet effect of spread­
ing the debt eve*' more miies of t#»ek plus the removal of 
any competition helped raise the revenue and profit of the 
now #©ad;#
Union Pacific, , * # 1,042 § 88,472,391.10 $ 84,906.32 '
Kansas Pacific end
Total 1,821 $124,215,909.60 $ 68,213.02
it would seem #t first blush that the bee roads were 
not similarly suited to combination because of the dissimilar­
ity in their financing, the total amount of capital steels 
was $46,371,650 which '*va*a«ed $25,574,?? per «iie {see Fig­
ure 5, p, 983, the point of interest wae the difference be-,
FIGURE 4:,
♦funded Debt, including principal, end.- balance of 
int*r||t due to the Unlit# ^ tttes;, January 31,
.Mileage Mount Per Mile
Leavenworth trench 
and Denver Pacific
43 ' '
Bodaa Papers. Vol. 170,
44
Gould testified {with his records) in 
amount was *35,162,518.50. Pac.Rv.Gomm.Rsoo; 
mony ©f Jay Gould, p, 8®i* - 
188? that this 
lac« C m,Report. Vol. 1, Tosti
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tween the/per mile average of capitalisation of the Union 
Pacific and the Kansas Paclfi c-ieavenwocth Branch-Denver 
Pacific, the former was almost three times as large as the 
letter. This wee dee to the feet that the Kansas Pacific 
wee built over what might he celled "easy" terrain, while 
the 'Union Pacific went over some of the most difficult to be 
encountered in railroad construction anywhere, added to 
which hod been the additional burden of the Credit Moblller.
m m m  &.
45
heed Mileage Amount
Union Pacific, , , . , , 1,042 $ 36,762,300 $35,280.51
Kansas Pacific end 
ieavenwerth Branch
Denver Pacific *
 693~\
* 106 J
9,809,350 12,592,77
Total 1,821 $ 46,571,650 825,574.77
Outstanding as above 9,809,350
Kansas Pacific stock in Treasury 191,750
Denver Pacific stock in Kansas Pacific
Treasury • « • • * * * • * * * * *^ *2S^ ,tSSS.
Total « » . » • * ,.$14 j 
It) absorbing the- Kansas Pacific-Denver Pacific com* 
pier If wee necessary to increase the capitalisation of the
Dodaa ■j^ twara. Vol. ■ 170.
new toad by fourteen million dollars over the capitalisation 
eg the Union Pacific in order to exchange the new read's 
stock for that of the old Kansas Pacific-leavenworth Branch* 
Oenver Pacific, This was done even though the Benver Paci­
fic stock ($3*998,900) and a small amount of Kansas Pacific 
stock ($191,750) was already in .the Kansas Pacific treasury, 
to has been mentioned, the jptnvef'Pacific stock hid m  real 
vain# except that which a consolidating road might place 
upon it*. Sincethe Kansas Pacific wholly owned the Beaver 
read the stack could have been ignored, hut -was notw
the .earnings of the two roads ware not comparable 
(see figures 6 and % p. 100), 'the Union Pacific had paid 
,dividends since 1876, bat the Kansas Pacific except'for * 
few good years during the 1867-79 period, had operated at a 
loss, the overall deficit was $11;,.130,771* - The enviable 
financial status of the Helen Pacific was due toits short 
route and its position as a connecting link'Within the 'trims* 
continental system, The financial problems'faced by the 
Kansas Pacific during these years were largely the result 
of poor financing and the policy of challenging the Union 
Pacific in rat# ware* increased population in the- Kansas 
Pacific trade ires was just reaching the point where if 
would help the road* Neither road had paid any interest an 
the Government debt. Hf thp too,;, only the Union Pacific'
wae in * position to have paid anything during the years 
since its completion. It was apparent that the roads were 
not of equal value and this explained the reluctance of the 
Boston Directors to agree te the consolidation.
FIGURE 6
J5zs=sa
Gj
1880**
1883
1.3
aa,:4s®ii34
24,258,817
22,823,854
i k a f e m
I Ta)|.49/ | f 
7*7Mil 
11*918,018' 
11,778,474
•The Union Pacific had been paying dividends since 1876- 
hut had net been paying the Government lean or interest
on it, ’ ■ i
**Th» first year the reads operated as e consolidated ©em-
F2GURI 7
Total Receipts 1867-78, ,
Sand .ted interest account,.
seme:period • * * • • • • 15.
Deficit S 6,525,069
Deficit, including accrued 
Interest due Government *ili*$$8t772
•Exclusive of accrued interest due Government.
liip.&v,8iaBMt^ 3tefl*^* Vol. I, Testimony of lay Gould*
Ihlrd.. Vol. VIII, Report of Accountant, p, 4878,
The hey fee the consolidation seems to have been, the 
threat imposed by the announcement of the Burlington1s In­
tention of extending lie line Into Denver* This caused 
Gould, according to Dexter, to meet the highest offer the 
Boston Directors made, that of a stock for stock exchange. 
This explanation may have been a rationalisation by the■ 
Boston Group* allowing teem a way out of a.difficult posi­
tion. Gould himself had made a threat earlier— that of 
continuing the Kansas. Pacific from Denver on to fait lake 
City or even the Pacific Coast., Threatened from bate sides 
the Union Pacific Directors had no reel choice) their only 
hope was to hold out far the bftst possible terras.. The 
Bodga-Humphreys letter served is tee Instrument of proof' 
of goad terms* Obviously the letter served the interests 
of 'Gould more than tease of the Union Pacific directora, 
but it did indicate teat the Union Pacific was not being 
Injured by tee move.
By entangling the various Union Pacific Directors in 
hie financial manipulation surrounding tee Kansas Pacific, 
Gould was insured of eventually winning the contest on his 
own terms. It would seem that Gould agreed to a steel:, for 
stock exchange as if ha wire giving e bargain to the Union 
Pacific, when in reality placing a value of equality upon, 
the two roads was over-estimating tee Kansas Pacific by 
fifty per cent. Regardless of book value of tee respective
roads* regardless of expressions of public opinion against 
it and its effects upon the- people served by the roads,'the 
consolidation took place, for hatter-or worse.
rotAJVfni -
.  * i
CQNCiUSION .
The web spun around the consolidation makes it diffi­
cult to determine whether it wee the work of Gould aIons or 
whether he wet drawn, as he hod claimed, into it by pressures 
too great to resist. Several questions present themselves 
for answer*-
1* Who profited from tee consolidation and to teat
extent?
2. teat was tee long range effect upon tee new 
road as a result of tee consolidation?
3, Vie tee consolidation necessarily 'tee only method 
by which tee two roads could have been Joined? Ware there 
any alternatives?
Obviously consolidation was net the only alternative 
open to Gould end the directors of tee two roads. The Union 
Pacific could have leased the Kansas Pacific -and its subsid­
iaries. This'offered an opportunity* -provided equitable 
terms could have been worked out* for' -both roads* The Kan­
sas Pacific complex would have enjoyed a profit with no 
operational expense and the Union Pacific an opportunity 
to have increased business through an enlarged trade sree 
without tee immediate competition of the other road* for 
somo strange reason a lease was not considered because the
two Pacific roads were thought to bo “one* and could not
I ' ' •
“make or accept a lease to itself," This argument reveals 
its spuriousness when the question is aekeds Why, then, 
was a consolidation necessary? The strongest argument < 
against leasing, and possibly the reason It was not imple- 
men ted, was ltd irapermenance,
Another alternative owe co-operation,- The boards of 
directors of both roads shared the services of several men 
and the officers of the- roads were the same* with an excep­
tion of the post ©f Secretary* A pool agreement* such as 
Gould proposed in 101® whereby the - securities could have ’ ■ 
been reduced to a first mortgage over.the entire-.road* a 
government lien over part of it, and $4,800,000 capital 
stock* was a likely choice* The only problem to such a move 
would have been a. determination as. to how each security, 
holder-would be repaid In reduced securities, The net ef­
fect would have been to create a financially stronger read 
than was eventually secured* There is eo record of such 
an alternative being, discussed by Gould and the dual-beard 
officers* hew the interests of these men could have bean 
dissimilar as they switched their hats as .directors and' 
officers seems hard to explain. One can only conclude';that 
while consolidation was not the most satisfactory altexna-
i;
1yac.Rv.Comm.Reoorf. Vol.I* Testimony of Axtetae# H* 
"Holmes, pp. 272-3. "t
tive it was the arrangement that was desired, the proposed 
construction by the Burlington into Benver was certainly a 
.factor* Consolidation with the Union Pacific eliminated 
all possibility of the Kansas Pacific and Benver Pacific 
being included in the Burlington System. Proa Gould's point 
of1 view* as the prime 'Kansas Pacific holder# the proposed 
Burlington plan meant— if completed before a consolidation 
was welded— the destruction of his control over the beet 
routes into Benver.
To Gould*a credit on# .factor should he brought to 
light. The railroads in the area west of the Missouri 
River presented a challenge to him. He envisioned the Mis­
souri as the hub of a great railway system, with the western 
roads bringing.business to paints along the river between 
Omaha and Kansas City and delivering it to the roods running 
east, "Just as the roads west of Chicago ...[delivered! to 
the reads that ...[ran] east from Chicago.'*2 This explained 
Why Gould and his. associates wire s.e active in acquiring
A?
Western railroads in the period under study. The charter of 
the Union Pacific forbade the extension of branch- 'lines into 
territory that was considered normally tributary to. it, -but 
the charter did not prohibit the acquisition of subsidiary
companies. This the Union Pacific under Gould had done, 'with
-,t",— voiin ;j i in i ^ Mrt/nT:,:,
Ibid.. Vol. 1* Testimony of Charles F. Adame,# p.5b.
106
'3
abandon.
Gould*a reason for acting in this manner was simple: 
he felt that Union Pacific should here been granted exclu­
sive railroad rights west of the Missouri River by Its 
charter* Consequently, he used legalistic means to circum­
vent it. His "plan was that the Union Pacific should go 
•head and occupy" the whole country west of the river* and 
bring the business 'to the reads east** without being 'hemp* 
ered by petty rules or regulations. He summed up.his posl* 
tion as follows i
My motive was thiss X thought that the Union 
Pacific should occupy the territory■tributary to it-and 
throw out feeders that would bring the business into 
the main line*, and keep pace with the development of 
the-great West, occupying- the country os feet os, or a 
little faster than* the population -went in to sustain 
it.©
* ^
In analysing the Gould "plan of development*' for East­
ern rsilroads, it would seem the Idee was both good end bed*
, It would have been good in that it would hsve greatly simpli­
fied the West's transportation problems both to end from the 
lest* it would have been bed in that it was. monopolistic,
plus the feet that Gould roads hid a reputation of giving. ■
4 .
notoriously bad service, the feet that he practically sue*
Ibid.. p. 45.
Ibjd.T Vei, I* Testimony of Jay Gould* p. ST?*
Grodinsfcy, oo. .ell*., p, 599.
seeded in implementing his *plen” shows the perserverenc© 
with which he pursued M e  objectives The uniting of the 
■ Union Pacific, Kansas facifi© and the Denver Pacific lute 
one road, the Union Pacific Railway Company, was possible 
only because the fSwMfte* did allow -that much— the union, of 
the Pacific roads—-but, the feet that the*# wete other roads 
west ef'-the Missouri to flee the Gould system stiff compe­
tition saved the West from suffering the rigors of an out­
right monopoly.
The question of who profited'and how much is one of 
those problems that can be answered only through the use of 
records the participants wanted to. reveal* . The mm  around 
Gould, of course, had e proportion in eech of the transac­
tions ■leading up te the consolidation. No doubt there must 
have been, considerable turning frnm the conference table, 
to count the shares of various stocks and the possible prof­
it’. accrual, as various consolidation terms were discussed.
Moat of .'the- stocks the ©the* Union Pacific directors
7
possessed was acquired upon the aivi©« of Gould. Frederick.
L. Ames, next to Gould, had the largest holding of Union
Pacific stock {par value, $3,861*200) and $969,QO0(par
8
value) Union Pacific bonds, mostly sinking fund issue*'
Pac.Ry,€oam.Reoort. Vol. 11* Testimony ofElisha Atkins
pt, 759*. " v.:,-
a .
ibid.. Vol., 11* Testimony of i»ti«*ick ■$,.* *»»©,. p*«§87*-
This gave him a total pax value holding in the Union Pacific
of $4,830,000. Asms* holdings in the Kansas Pacific were
net quite as heavy. He held $179,600 par value stock, .
$635,000 par value consolidated moxtgage bonds, and $14,000
per value Kansas Pacific {Denver Extension) bonds, for a
9
to ta l par v a lu e  of $828,600. Ames also  held some $100,000 
par valu e  firs t*m o rtg ag e  bonds of the S t. Joseph and west-
\  ‘f  .v - ' -
ern Railroad, alongwith 475 shares of its stock {par value,
■1©
$47,500), At the time of the consolidation all these 
stocks and bends were exchanged fat Union.Pacific securities 
at par* which meant that teas received' a total'-of $5,806,100 
in various securities of the new road, taking for fronted 
that M s  original .Union Pacific securities .had real-value 
w a u M  ,« ih... hi. px.fl, »  ,!» «..«. Wclfl. «< «. u  
Joseph and Western securities approximated $180,000 on paper, 
Elisha Atkins possessed a total par value Union Peel* 
fie securities holding of $806*700,.divided' between 2,937 
shares of stock {par value $293,700) and $513,000 pa* value 
bends (lend grant end sinking fund), 'His Kansas PacSic se­
curities consisted of 1,810 shares of stock {par value*
li'Ibid1’.
Ibid.* p. 686,
Ibid.. Vol. iS*. Testimony of Slleha Atkins, p. 754,
$90,500) and $28,570 pax value consolidated mortgage find
13
Denver Extension bonds. Atkins held $30,000 par value 
tow. rf Vtoim. 1..W 0* tho St. J..«h MS *>.*»<>
with 142 shares of stock (pas value, $14,200), When consoli­
dation terms were completed Atkina received a total of $969,970 
par value Union Pacific Railway securities. Using th® earn© 
formula as before, this meant a paper profit of §115,336 to 
hU. »«1», hi. wn B M i  »»««> .wt »f ,U tot tto o«9l- 
nal Union Pacific securities, \
t» Gordon Dexter, in January, 168®, held only stock 
in the'Uhlan Pacific consisting of 6,376 shares (per value, 
$637,600). his Kansas Pacific holdings consisted of 
$131,570 par value bonds of various classes and 896 shares 
of stock (par value, $44,900), Hi* holdings in the St,Jo­
seph and Western duplicated that of Atkins, 330,000 par..
value bonds of two classes and 142 shares of -stock (per
18
value, $14,200). Dexter came out .of-the consolidation 
with securities of the new road valued at a par $858,270*
Again- using the formula, as above, this gave him a .paper:
 1§.  .
ibid.
14 "
Ibid., p. 756,
15
ibid..pp. 754 and 756, Atkina reported that his total 
expense for the Kansas Pacific -and St* Joseph and -Weetern se­
curities amounted to $47,934* , ,
16
Ibid.. Vol.II, Testimony of F*Gordon Dexter, p*?00*
Xf Ibid., p. 761*'
18 Ibid,, p« 702*
profit of $152,630, using Dexter’s own securities cost ■
It
figures.
The list of -the Boston Oisectors, im whom date was
available, is Bare H. Balter. Baker controlled 3,30? chares
Of Union Pacific stock going into the Consolidation (par
value, $330,700i* His holdings in the Kansas Pacific •
amounted to a total of $17,000 par value-’ bands of1 two is- '
sues,' $175 in unpaid interest coupons, and 548 shores of
steak (pa* value, $27,400). Baker’s interest in the -St,
Joseph and Western consisted of $30,000 par value bonds and
95 shares of stack (pat value, $9,500). His share in the-
consolidation that January totaled $404,775 in securities
of the. new road. This gave him paper.
using his own securities cost figures.
When Gould began purchasing his interest in the Kan#. -
sas Pacific, the read was in a bad’ financial condition, but.
he sild "it was an immensely valuable"' property* intrinsically 
24
Whether thia was what he really believed or whether
IlsM* . pp. 701 and 702* Dexter listed his total casts,
excluding original wide Pacific stock, as $67,900,
* *
' Ibid.. Vol. II, Testimony of Etr* H. .Bake*,, p, 738. 
gt 
iMdt
3S
"Aftt** p. 719* a
23
Ibid.. -pp, 738 and 739*
24.
Ibid. Vol. 1, p. 464*
>rofits of $51, 
IB
All
he saw $■ badly managed road In trouble with deflated securl 
ties, that could be acquired at low prices, is difficult to 
determine. Regardless of the motivating force Gould began 
the acquisition, that culminated in the consolidation of 
1880, and reporting later his Kansas Pacific holdings cost 
him $3,058,024*99 ' A conservative estimate (see Figure 8, 
p. 112), .put Gould*s profit in the consolidation at  ^
$866,766.76, net taking Ante consideration any- profit made 
eh his Kansas Pacific securities.,:
Other estimates,- which included profits on Kansas
fself16 securities, varied from ahighof forty million
" 26 •
dollar* to a low of tan million dollars, 'the forty million 
dollar figure is Out Of lint In light of the foot that the 
sum total of stock# and bonds on the Kansas Pacific and 
Denver Pacific was $49,551,768,50 ft the time of consolida­
tion. -Gould In a marvelous under#tstment said’he "...did
m
not lee# any money** The Villard estimate of tin million 
dollars seems to be a more reasonable guess asto Gould** 
’total profit*.
#■*■ P*
Fortunes, p.482 end
27 '- ■
Pac.Ry.Comm.Beoort. Vol. I. p. ■ 558.
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What affect <114 the consolidation have oh the Union '* 
Pacific? the law. years prior to the consolidation found the 
railroad in a very favorable financial condition. Between 
July 1, 1875, and January 1, 1880, the Union Pacific Railroad 
paid eighteen dividends varying from one and one-half to two 
per cent totaling $11,942,125* After the consolidation, be- 
twean April 1*. 1880 and April 1* 1884* the new road paid 
dividends varying from one and one-half to one end three-quar­
ters .per cent totaling $16,708,645,13 upon m much larger capi- 
taliration. By 1884, the' new road was unable to continue 
dividend payment#. Additional competition earn from the 
completion of the Northern Pacific to Seattle making a third 
tranceontinenta1 line* there me also a general business de­
pression which adversely affected the earnings of all rail*' 
roads, A decrease in income led to an increase in the float-- ■ 
lag debt on the road from $3,482,315,74 to $6,900,177.95 in 
the four-year period between 1880-1884, .A psychological blow 
was the sudden realisation that the rash of branch linos
built et great expense just prior to the consolidation were of
-fliJI-
"no considerable Value,*" Finally, the -threat Of Congressional 
action to enforce payment of the Government lien in 1883,
Ibid.. Vol.Vlll,Report of Accountant, William Calhoun
nr* ‘
X2»
caused the Union Pacific id pay $700*000 on the debt rather
3.3
than declare ah annual dividend the next year. Further 
attempts to retire .the Government lien became too much fox 
the road to handle, within a decade it was bankrupt and in 
the hands of a receiver.
Regardless of the destructive effect of the consolida­
tion over the short range* It* long range effect we* benefi­
cial. • Following a period of adjustment end reorganisation, 
the road emerged an excellent example of a well-run end well* 
operated road, lied it net. been for the mileage acquired by 
the consolidation of 1880* this favorable condition might 
net have existed. •
.Any reel evaluation of the consolidation must Include 
an evaluation of lay Gould, for ell practical purposes the 
man wee - the Union end Kansas Pacific roads. 'He needed only 
an association 'With industry to become a tfuly representa­
tive entity of the "Gilded Age,a' H# grew up with the eta* 
matured with it*-' and passed from the scene with the period,
M« .made contributions end wreaked his damage. Mi* contribu­
tions were few but lasting.# The Gould lines ate given credit 
for the innovation of interline freight# shipping freight"in 
the seme car over several feeds* thus affecting substantial
i . ,  i
savings to the reads end shippers in. both.time end cost.
 !♦ r p . b *
33
frank H, Spearman, 
York* Charles Scribner’s
This contrasted with the previous custom of each toad trans­
ferring freight to its own ears when the freight came onto 
its line. Another contribution by Gould was the permanent 
lowering of freight rates in the west end southwest. the 
original purpose may net hive been to benefit the Western :
customer but this was the end result, because sates once
34 '
lowered' were e l m  to increase.
■ The rugged individualism of Jfaf Gould was no better or .
no worse than any of the "Robber Barons." He ma one of the
moat hated financiers both in and out of Wall Street. The
Grangers looked upon him as the "Railroad Promoter, incarnate."
35
and held 'hie in greet distrust. It was men like Gould who'
caused Western disillusionment m m  railroads; the West had
earlier looked upon railroads .as a panacea for ill econo- 
36
aic ills."
An individual caught up in the tenor of the times 
cannot be Judged by any ether than the standards of his own 
times, J«y Gould was a result of his times and representative 
of it. ThoSe he destroyed wore ploying the same game— just
Grodiosky, op. cit.. pp,S54-57Q»
35
Moody, QP.eit.. pp. 214-15,
36 . . .
Robert s, Relgel, "Missouri Pacific Railroad to 1879," 
tijspeurj Historical Review. Vol. 18, 11924), p, S.
not quite so well. Me was a devoted and loving lathes?* His 
leisure moments were spent i® horticulture and conversation 
with John Burroughs, the famous Nineteenth Century naturalist. 
This would net indicate an individual devoid of morals. How 
titan can his, and other of the "Robber Barons*,” actions be 
explained? "
lack of 'liberal education wouldseera to be an answer. 
Gould, along with the teat, bad little in the way of formal edu­
cation— * the type: ’of education that builds 'a social awareness 
el the individual**., duty to society. Gould came onto the 
scene in a society that had exploded' industrially, railroad
m 3 Gmpm&tim f ittaiio# m m  al111' lit oiothdt * -m3
liti la mat# ftteift tht low of tha jwifio m  mlm- at ■
pii4ap#«is f m  W m l m m  activity. ' § m m § m  m 3  Eaukafaiieir 
aailawai in tii in. lift lit mm ttiiy
flfiy*»aowifi ym m &  of #§o* Mtytt his: iittft would havt thaaftd 
slightly had ha Mvtd it. into iho fwaatisth
ft ".tht tttitMdaflti* t iaaM a f## tfiJji§i tt# #pps&#*it.*
It wit iht first m$m aoosolMstioit of Is### tail*
xtatt# It added fual -to a ftalijtf of tavulsici* that had bsei* 
hiilldinf • im i«i' A fooling that oofttgihuied to tha
pmmft of fht Interstate a act im 1887* thila it did-
M%:bMppm Immediately* ihi# itvatwihtal .aifia fiht lateae*
state Cagteofoo ai|dsesi tha ddimfali of miffed m *
restrained Individualism in the transportation end of the • 
business community*. Because the railroads were big end'! 
strong end their abuses apparent .end felt at the. local level 
it was only nature! that 'the Grangers end others would de­
mand that regulation strike the railroads first. Corporate 
organisation had developed farther, faster, and ear# effi­
ciently than had government and the teat of society, This 
was obvious by the fast that public opinion had little m  no 
effect upon Gould and 'bis.group while they developed the 
consolidation plans, while the very .'long range effect for 
the Union Pacific was the strong toad of today# the short 
range pillaging’by Gould left its mark. This was why it 
eventually became necessary for the public interest to be 
inserted Info the corporate comaunityj an attempt, as it 
were to keep the corporate fail from wagging the social body
ft#Hi
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APPENDIX
A, LETTEH FROM OffiBWJUB «. DODGE AND SOiGN 
HUMPHREYS to UN*®*! PACIFIC DIRECTORS1' .
ttesers, - Jay Gould, Russel Saga, F. Gordon Dexter.
■ • ■ - •’ ■ iiishe Atkins, .f*ed, f* Ames, %  II#' SalipjB,
if ■ 4 ’ f  ? •■
Gentlemen*
We acknowledge receipt ®$ the following letter, signed 
by you and dated New York, Oct, 23, 1879.
"Gen. G. M. Dodge, end 
Solon Humphries [sic*] ‘Sag*
Gentlemens
The undersigned, Directors in the Union Pacific .and 
in the Senses Pacific Rail Read Companies, eonci#ving[6ic.] 
that a consolidation of■the*# companies, upon equitable 
conditions will promote the interests of each, as well 
a* these wf the public and knowing yea* familiarity with 
the problem* which each « step involves* and having con­
fidence .la yew judgment we unite in requesting you to 
thoroughly consider, and with all convenient speed, xa- 
. port upon the basis and terms of a fair just and equit­
able consolidation of the two companies,®
In compliance with the request wherein, we have con­
sidered the question of th# consolidation of the Union Peelfie, 
'the Kansas Pacific end the' Denver Pacific Rail Roads, end
respectfttiiy submit #«* conclusion.
It is manifest from the Act of Congress of 1862, end 
the move enlarged provisions in the Act of 1864, for consoli­
dation, as mti ss by the provisions of subsequent legisla­
tion, requiring the Pacific Roads unde* heevy penalties to 
be operated throughout their whole extent as one continuous , 
line that Congroea contemplated such consolldationa® probable 
end it is equally manifest from past experience, that this 
requirement '&m he much better carried m% where the roads 
are under'one management then where they axe under two.
1"Letterbook. November 30* 1878 to April 1* 1880,*
Haftai Isesia* v«i* 386*.
In considering the question of consolidation we first 
sought the views of the.operating department of each reed as 
to the comparative condition of the-, two roads and the probable 
results of such consolidation.
We next considered the comparative value of the taw 
properties their earning capacity and .the effect upon the 
country they now accommodate, and their future natural ex­
tensions, end-finally the economy of such consolidation, and 
its policy. .
without entering Into detail# we will state, briefly 
the result# that control our recommendation*
First. ' The operating departments of the two roads consider a 
consolidatlsn as very deslreable, so. far as they are con­
cerned, They, hold that it will largely decrease■their ex­
penses, and increase their gross and net earnings, and harmo­
nise conflicting interests} that they can better accomodate 
the traffic that pertains to each and obtain better, net re­
sults therefrom. '■
Second. The present condition of the -two roads, their road 
beds, structures, equipment .shops, terminal facilities nay 
be considered to be first-class, and ample for the business 
they now transact.. Their earning capacity ia being steadily 
increased to meet future demands'and the. earnings of both 
roads for the year 1379 show very satisfactory results*
Third, The country that each seels.s., in the future to de­
velop is naturally tributary to bath and a strong* prosper­
ous end healthy Railway would be much .more likely to afford 
adequate railway facilities than would be the case with two 
warring and rival companies.
Especially Is this the case in the large and growing 
state- of Colorado and In the’Territory' of Wyoming, Again, 
on# corporation, of the wealth and receiving the earning# 
of these two roads, used, under one direction could develop 
new territory and advance capital to build new lines -that, at 
first the country would not justify.
Fourth* Both roads reach*: and compete for business from* the 
same eastern and western commercial centers, While their lo­
cal interests are widely separated, hence under one management 
these conflicting interests-' -would be hormafilxed and sore eco­
nomically administered*
-fifth* The Union Pacific end Kansas Pacific Railroads (ia- 
eluding the Denver Pacific end ell theif other branches} 
have today a mileage of'about 3746 miles* Necessarially[sie.] 
conflicting as 'they grow nearer to each other or as they'-' 
contend for the same 'territory* Today it is ail paying prop­
erty* and it is the duty of the owners* if passible to har­
monise their interests and protect their future*
These considerations together with the fact that the 
physical conditions of the road are about the seme* their 
earning capacity being about equal■as compared with their 
indebtedness and with the strong connection of those who - 
opperete [sic*] the two- properties and the benificial [sic.] 
results t# be obtained from operating them as one, we have - 
concluded 'to recommend to- you that they should be conaoli- - 
dated-In accordance with their Charters upon the following 
basis.
'the new company fa be known ss the Union Pacific Rail­
way ®a* That i*» the Union Pacific Rail Read, with a stock 
capital of *36,762,300. and the Kansas Pacific Rail Road in* 
eluding the Denver Pacific Railway with stock capital as 
follows*
Kansas Pacific $1 0,000,000
shall .be consolidated"into the. Vhleft,Pacific Railway with a 
stock.capital of $S1,762,300 “and the stock of the Union-Pa­
cific- Railway* after consolidation,, to-be issued for the 
stock of the Union Pacific, the Kansas Pacific and Denver ~ 
.Pacific Rail Reids, share for share*'
The Union Pacific Railway would then represent a mileage 
of actually construeted end operated .road of <3746 miles or less 
then $14,000 of stock, per mile, controlling end developing * 
Territory, now in its infancy, the growing business of which, 
end its rapid development has astonished everyone.
-its future business no one can. now safely predict but is 
beyond question that such a consolidation and such a corpora­
tion would control as rainy, if- not more, miles..of paying road 
then any other in the world, end would have # strength, charac­
ter end -ability tme' future growth and development, unprecedented
Trusting that our consideration of 'this-.subject and our 
conclusion therein rasy meet yea* approval*
•» are. Gentlemen
Denver Pacific 
Making a- total of
Very Respectfully Tours,
G. M, fodg#
Solon Humphreys
Note footing error
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B. ARTICLES GF UNION AND CGNSOtlOATlQN
BETSJEEM the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the Kansas Pacific 
Railway Company, and the Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph
Company, ■ • ■. 1 ....:
FORMING THE UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,'
WHEREAS, The’ Union Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation 
duly organised and existing under the Act of.Congress of .
July 1st,; 1862, entitled: "Aft Act of aid in the construction 
of «irailroad and telegraph line from the Missouri Elver to 
the Pacific Ocean, and to secure to the Government the use of - 
the same for Postal, Military, and other purposes." and. the 
Act of Congress: of July 2d, 1864, and various'- other' afeth* 
amendatory of the foregoing, owns & line of railroad and tele* 
graph, - extending - from- the Missouri River -to' Ogden In the 
Territory of Utah, a 'distance of 1,042 miles; and,
55HEREAS, the Kansas Pacif ic-Railway Company, described in, 
.the said Act of Congress of July 1st, 1862, as the Leavenworth, 
Pawnee t Western Railroad Company, the name whereof was’after* 
wards changed to 'that of thesunion Pacific-Railroad Company, 
Eastern Division, and again subsequently changed .to'the'Kansas 
Pacific Railway Company, i« « corporation which is antitied , 
to participate in--the benefits of" the1 said Act of'Congress of 
July. 1st, 1862, pud of July 2d, 1864, -and the various acta 
amendatory thereof and relating thereto; arid,' '
WHEREAS, The paid Kansas pacific .Railway Company owns and 
operates as a branch of the Union Pacific Railroad a railroad 
and telegraph line* from a point eennecttngwlth the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad, in Kansas City, in Missouri, thence from 
the Missouri River,'at the mouth of theKansea River, on the 
south side thereof, with a spur from .Wyandotte in the State 
of Kansas, being from'the'Seat State line'of Kansas.’to Denver, 
639 miles in length, with a branch from « point on the sain 
line- near Lawrence, to Leavenworth, 34 miles in langth, in 
said State of Kansas, connecting at Denver with the Denver 
Pacific Railway, and is entitled to extend said-’railroad to 
the western boundary of the former Territory of Kansas, to 
locate and construct breaches'-of said‘railroad in‘the'Counties 
of the former Territory of Kansas, adjacent to the line of 
said railroad* as then located and defined by-‘law;' and, '
fcSBEREAS, The 'Denver Pacific Railway -and Telegraph Company, -. 
under and by virtue of the said Acts of‘Congress, 'and'of an 
Act of'Congress-approved March 3d# 1869, entitled'! **An Act to 
euthoriae the transfer of - lends.granted'to the Union Pacific 
Railway Company,, Eastern Division,1 between- Denver end the ; 
point of connection with 'the Union Pacific Railroad, to 'the.
John F* Dillon, Pacific Railroad Lews.. E. C. Miles',
N, Y,, 1890, pp. 200-209.
Denver Pacific Railway end Telegraph Company,- 'end to expe- ' 
dite the completion of railroads -to Denver -Is -the Territory 
of Colorado!,! end ef an Act 'of Congress approved' June 20th,
1874, which,'among other things, enacts that for oil- the 
purposes of the said Act of July 1st, 1862, end of the acta 
amendatory thereof!
' “The Denver Pacific Railway end Telegraph Company shall 
he deemed end taken 'to be a pert end extension of the toed of 
the Kansas Pacific Railroad to the point of junction thereof 
with the toed of the Union Pacific Railroad Company at Chey­
enne, as'provided In the Act ef March $d, 1869," whereby, end 
fay. force whereof, 'the said Denver Pacific Railway and Tele* 
graph Company'la ’likewise entitled to participate' In the bene­
fits of the aforementioned Acta of Congress of July 1st,1862, 
and July 2d, 1864, and the-various acts .-amendatory thereof 
and supplemental thereto, and relating to the Pacific system 
of railroads, all of which, whether, particularly herein des­
cribed o* not,, are, for greater certainty in - this behalf, ■ 
referred to and made part hereof! and,
SHEREAS, In the aforesaid legislation of Congress, appli­
cable to the above-mentioned three railroad companies, it la 
provided that they may unite and consolidate their respective 
organizations! and,
WHEREAS, Each of the said above-mentioned three companies, 
by corporate action duly and severally had, have resolved, 
pursuant te the authority in that behalf vested in them fey 
law, to unite end consolidate their respective organisations 
into one company , end have severally agreed to end with each 
ether upon the terms of such union and consolidation, feeing 
the terms herein embodied and expressed!
-, Ml.ftD.-and cpasglldatApg.. made this,
the twenty-fourth day of January, A*D. 1880, between the said 
Union Pacific Railroad Company, party of the first part, the 
said -Kansas Pacific Railway Company, - party of the second part, 
and the said Denver Pacific Railway'and Telegraph Company, 
party, of the third .part, .- >
WITNESSETH, That th# said parties have respectively agreed, 
and do hereby severally agree' to -end with each other, upon 
the following Articles of Union and Consolidation of their 
respective organisations into one company, via.;—
Article 1, The said Union Pacific -Railroad Company, the 
said Kansas Pacific Railway Company, and tho said Denver 
Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company, in consideration of 
the premises, do hereby severally agree to and with each other 
to unite and consolidate, and do hereby unite, form and consoli­
date their respective organisations, properties-, - and companies 
into one consolidated- company, which, shall succeed to, possess, 
sndtbe entitled' to receive fro® the Government cf the United
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States all and singular the grants, benefits, immunities, 
guarantees, sets and things to be etene and performed, and ba 
subject to the same team®, conditions, restrictions, and re­
quirement* which the aforesaid three companies respectively, 
at the date' of this consolidation, are, or may be, entitled 
or .subject to under- the. Acts of Congress in that behalf* in 
place and substitution of' said constituent companies,: so 
consolidated,. respectively; and the said consolidated' company 
assumes to and for itself ell of the - provisions of said .Acts 
of Congress, m  far asappllcablfe.relatine or in any -manner 
appertaining to said constituent companies or either of them, 
including the power to sue and be sued in all courts whether 
federal or State, and the right of corporations organized 
under a law of -'the- United states to remove causes .from #teie, 
te Federal courts; and all'of the previsions of .the afore* ' 
mentioned. Acta of Congress,.and each .of them, so far as in 
their nature applicable .to'the company 'hereby formed, shall 
apply thereto* it being the intent of the parties hereto and 
of these Articles of Union and Consolidation to organize the 
company hereby formed under the said. Acta of Congress, and to 
make the Sets of this company as fully- as If the same were 
incorporated herein at large.
Art.11. The-name of the consolidated company hereby formed 
shall be tm  UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY CC»ANY,
Art,III, The capital stock of the- said Union Pacific hell* 
way Company shall be fifty millions,seven hundred,and sixty 
two thousand three hundred dollars {$50,762,300} {being the 
total aggregate amount of the outstanding stock, of the three 
constituent companies), which shall be divided Into shares 
of one hundred dollars each, end it shell be issued in lieu, 
of the stock of the said constituent companies on -the surren­
der thereof, for that purpose, by the, respective holders 
thereof. ;
Ivory stockholder in the Oenver Pacific Railway end Tele­
graph Company end in the Union. Pacific Railroad Company shall 
receive* in. piece of every share, of on# hundred dollars sur­
rendered, « share.of one 'hundred dollars in the new company, 
and every stockholder in the Kansas Pacific Railway Company, 
the shares in which are only fifty dollars C$50) each, shall 
resolve,- in place of every- two share* of the stock at the 
time held by such stockholder in such company* a share'of the 
capital stock of the new corporation, upon surrendering to the 
new corporation the certificates of stock -held' by -such stock­
holder ,
' Art.1V. The.- said new corporation shall*, without unnecessary 
delay. Issue certificates of stock*, in such form as may by the 
beard of directors be deemed advisable, and such beard' shall 
provide and adept such rule* and regulations #• may.be nece­
ssary and proper-for the issuing and transfer of shares of ' 
stock of the said new corporation*
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Art. V. The directors of the said Union Pacific Railway 
Company, to be elected %  the stockholders at the annual l 
meetings herein provided for, shell he fifteen in number,* 
each at whom met he the hone. fide owner of at least fifty 
shares of stock in the consolidated company, .inch direc­
tors shall be chosen annually by # majority #f the votes of 
'the stockholders voting in person or by proxy at such elec­
tion. And they shall continue to be directors until others 
axe elected and qualified in their places, lie person shall 
be a director unless he shell be qualified to vote for dir­
ectors st the election'®t which he shall be chosen* and va­
cancies in the board of directors ray be filled by the remain­
ing directors at. any regular meeting of the board.
The directors of said company shall, annually, as aeon as 
may be after their election, elect free their own number a 
president end vice-president, and shell else.elect a trea­
surer and secretary.
Art. Vl. The following-named persona .shall be the. first 
directors of said corporation, vir*«
L. tees. Solon Humphreys
H. hake* David Dows
Elisha Atkins William 1, Scott
f* Gordon Dexter . Sites H* H..Clark
Sidney Dillon ■ Thomas T. Ickert
Russell Sage John Sharp
ley Gould . Grenville U. Dodge
: : Carlos Greeley
The followingnamed persons shall be the first, officers ef 
the said corporation via.*. ■
President, Sidney Dillon. ■
Vice-President, Elisha Atkins. .
• ■ ■ Treasurer and secretary# Henry McFarland.
The said directors and officers shall continue in office 
until their successors ere chosen* as provided in thee® -
Art* VII, ' Until otherwise duly provided, theannuel meet- • 
ings of the Stockholders of the Union Pacific Railway Company 
•hall be held at the company's offlee* in the City of Mew - 
York, on the first Wednesday following the fourth day of 
March in each year*, between the hours of 10 o'clock A. m, 
end 4 o'clock P. M. of
iMW Wjj
'In addition five Government directors, were.'to ba_appoint< 
ed fey the fresiden* of the United States by de6?*fen of Ufor- 
ney General, Charles sevens,, march 8, 1880, see footnote 
p. 204 of Sillon, BisMifiS- %>■ &MB.*
Notice.of such meeting shell he given as may be prescribed 
by the by-lews.
- These provisions may be changed by ’the stockholders of the 
consolidated company at any annual meeting of the stock­
holders.
Art. viii. fh.e parties hereto of the' first end second end- 
third parts hereby assign, transfer* set over* and convey, 
unto,the said Union Pacific Railway Company, the consolidated 
corporation hereby formed, all the rights* privileges*, exemp­
tions* and franchisee of etch of said companies* parties 
hereto* end ell the property* real* personal, and mixed,.and- 
all theses in action, debts, on whatever account, of*, owing* or 
belonging to either of said companies* and all claims* demands* 
property, rights of -way* leases* leasehold Interests* branches* 
iron rails* rolling stock* tools and implements, -'and property 
of every description* name*' and nature:* belonging to either 
of the sold companies, with.the appurtenances, to be 'held*' 
earned, and.controlled by the said consolidated corporation* 
its suceesaorS-and assigns, as fully and completely* to ail 
intents and purposes, .at the respective parties thereto do 
or can now own, hold* use, enjoy* or control the same; and 
the - parties hereto agree to execute and deliver to said con­
solidated corporation instruments of transfer or assignments, 
or other instruments proper or necessary to carry out the 
covenants, conditions, and provisions of this agreement.
This assignment, transfer, sale, and conveyance is made to 
-the said.consolidated corporation subject to ill liens,charges* 
and equities pertaining thereto, , ■
Art. IX. Nothing in this agreement contained -shall affect . 
or .prejudice any rights otherwise existing of the consolidated 
company to make ..such further increase, of stock or bonds as 
said consolidated company may by law fee entitled to make* or 
restrict the amount Of stock or bends which such consolidated 
company is by law authorised to issue or make,
wor shall anything herein contained affect or impair'the 
right to - issue all.unissued bonds under the .Kansas Pacific 
Consolidated Mortgage of date May 1st*' 1879, wherein lay Gould 
end Russell Rage are Trustees! but such unissued bonds may* - - 
notwithstanding 'this consolidation* be issued in the same 
manner end with the cam# effect in. all respects as if tke.se- 
er tide* .had- not been adopted and' executed, .
And it is expressly agreed:' that the stockholders of the - 
consolidated company shall have all the powers which would 
have been possessed by the stockholders of -each constituent 
company if this consolidation had not been effected* to ratify* 
approve* end carry out any .contracts made by -either eonstitu- ' 
ent company, end requiring the ratification ox approval'of its 
stockholders. /.
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The power of the Union Pacific Railroad Company to issue 
ell unissued bonds .under the mortgage of July let. 1879, 
wherein the Union Trust Company is Trustee, is fully end 
completely reserved*
- 'Art* X. The new company hereby formed does not herein 
aseumo eny separate or individual liability for the- outstand­
ing debts, obligations, end liabilities of the respective 
constituent companies, whose severel. tod separate existence 
as to third, parties shall, as respects such debts,obligations, 
end liabilities of every kind and nature, still-continue net* 
withstanding these Article* of Union end Consolidation* But 
nothing herein contained shell prevent any validdebt, obli­
gation, or liability of either constituent company from being 
enforced against the property of the proper constituent 
company, which fey force of-these articled becomes the pro* 
party of the consolidated company.
The corporate existence of the respective constituent 
companies shall not absolutely cease eo instant! m  the con* 
summation of the union and consolidation norein provided for, 
but shall remain end: continue so far as necessary to carry out 
the intent end purpose thereof.
Art, XI, These Articles of Consolidation shell go into 
effect, and- the consolidated company hereby formed shall come 
into existence#: upon the day on which a copy hereof i* filed
in the Department -of the Inferior, as provided in the legis­
lation of Congress in that behalf .3 -
Art, XII, The existing fey*Iaws of the Union Pacific Rail* • 
road Company ere. hereby provisionally adopted, .and shall apply 
to the company hereby formed, until duly changed or repealed.
.Art, VIII. All books, vouchers# records, instruments of 
title* cash, evidence.of'debt* contracts and documents per*
.tainlng to the business or property of the said three companies, 
parties hereto, shell, without delay, fee delivered to the pro­
per -officer* of the consolidated company, and the said book*., 
records* and papers shell fee deemed and taken# as far as nece­
ssary, as the' records end books* records, vouchers, and papers 
shell fee subject to the peeper examination and inspection of 
all parsons interested therein,
Art, XIV. These articles may be- emended end modified, from 
time to time, end in such manner as the holders of two*thirds 
of the stock of the consolidated company may direct or approve.
3
Took effect January 26, 1800 upon filing in Department 
of Interior, Dillon, M m W S  &• 1-fcSHS.. p. 208,-
mArt. W't This agreement shell be executed on the part of 
the respective parties hereto, by the proper officers, end 
under'the corporate seals of said companies.
In Witness Whereof, -the said parties have caused their 
respective corporate.seals to'be- hexe-unto affixed, and the 
same to be attested by their- respective Presidents and Secre­
taries, this the twenty-fourth day of January. 1880.
THE UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CC&PANY.
[Seal] By Sidney billon,
' g2£SMm& >
Attest.
Henry KeFarland*
Attest,
THE KAN6ASPACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,
[Seal] By Sidney Dillon,
SxmiisM
•A, H. Calef,
THE DENVER PACIFIC RAILWAY & TELEGRAPH COMPANY,
[Seal] By S. M. Edgerton,
Attest. -
Seal. ■ D. H. Moffatt* Jr.,:
asMaa §mm$sxx»
■ The ••Union Pacific Railway-Company-has signified and hereby 
signifies Its assent- to and acceptance- of the foregoing Arti­
cles of Union and Consolidation, January 24, 1880.
THE Willi PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY,
By Sidney Dillon,
SSfilMiiS-.
iSfi
